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ABSTRACT
As a matter of constitutional doctrine, the right to keep and bear
arms is coming of age. But although the doctrine has begun to mature
in the decade since District of Columbia v. Heller, scholars, advocates,
and judges disagree about (and sometimes simply do not know) how
to characterize it.
This Article is the first comprehensive empirical analysis of postHeller Second Amendment doctrine. Beginning with a set of more than
one thousand Second Amendment challenges, we have coded every
available Second Amendment opinion—state and federal, trial and
appellate—from Heller up until February 1, 2016. The dataset is deep
as well as broad, including dozens of variables regarding the content of
each challenge, not just whether it prevailed. Our findings help provide
an objective basis for characterizing Second Amendment doctrine and
framing new scholarly inquiries. This is a particularly important task
now, as the Amendment becomes a part of “normal” constitutional law
and increasingly susceptible to the standard tools of legal analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
For at least a generation, the predominant—nearly sole—question
for Second Amendment law and scholarship was whether the right to
keep and bear arms extends beyond the organized militia. In District
of Columbia v. Heller,1 the Supreme Court resolved that question: As
a matter of constitutional doctrine, the right protects keeping and
bearing arms for private purposes like self-defense against crime.2
In the decade since Heller, Second Amendment law, scholarship,
and advocacy have moved on to new battlefields.3 Disputes about the
underlying purposes and themes of the Second Amendment remain
important and, in significant ways, unresolved.4 But most of the
1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
2. Id. at 636.
3. Eric M. Ruben & Darrell A. H. Miller, Preface: The Second Generation of Second
Amendment Law & Policy, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 4–9 (2017).
4. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, What Is Gun Control? Direct Burdens,
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important, timely, and difficult questions involve determining what
kinds of regulations are consistent with the individual right to keep and
bear arms. An entire field of constitutional doctrine is being built from
the ground up—a rare challenge and opportunity for judges, lawyers,
and scholars.
The maturation of the Second Amendment debate has
simultaneously required and generated a new set of legal tools.
Throughout the first generation of the Second Amendment debate,
many scholars and advocates argued that the right to keep and bear
arms must be taken seriously as an individual constitutional right.5 The
underlying materials supporting this argument were not drawn
primarily from case law—indeed, with the exception of a district court
opinion that was later overturned, no federal court prior to Heller had
ever struck down a gun regulation on Second Amendment grounds.6
Instead, the argument was essentially one from constitutional first
principles, and it correspondingly made heavy use of constitutional
text, history, and the like.7
Those tools are still useful and important. But now that the
individual right to keep and bear arms is regularly invoked in court—
generating more than one thousand Second Amendment opinions
since Heller—those involved in the gun debate must also account for

Incidental Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 295, 301–
02 (2016) (investigating whether incidental burdens do or should trigger Second Amendment
scrutiny); see also Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens and the Nature of Judicial Review, 83 U.
CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 97, 103–07 (2016) (discussing whether the Second Amendment is distinct
from other rights in that it does not have an equality component).
5. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF
A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT, at xi–xii, 3–6, 197 (1984); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing
Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 658–59 (1989).
6. Clark Neily, District of Columbia v. Heller: The Second Amendment Is Back, Baby,
2007–2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 127, 140. In United States v. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D.
Tex. 1999), rev’d and remanded, 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), the district court declared 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(8) (2012) (criminalizing possession of a firearm while under a restraining order)
unconstitutional on its face and held that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right
to bear arms. Id. at 614. The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that the Second
Amendment guarantees an individual right to bear arms, but reversed on the basis that the statute
did not violate that right. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 264–65.
7. Treatises, books, collections, law review articles, online articles, and newspaper articles
account for ninety-four of the 175 sources cited by the majority in Heller. Dictionaries account for
another six. The remainder includes federal and state cases, state and federal statutes, state
constitutions, and legislative history. Those ninety-four sources make up 136 of the 270 citations
in the opinion (150 if one counts dictionaries). We are grateful to Alyssa Rutsch, Duke Law Class
of 2015, for reviewing the citations.
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evolving precedent.8 In the first generation of the gun debate, legal
doctrine was the desired output; now it must be an input as well. If the
first question was whether to treat the Second Amendment right as
unconnected to militia service, the second question is how to do so. Put
simply, the debate has shifted not only in substance, but in
methodology—generally, from interpretation to construction;9
meaning to implementation;10 first principles to doctrine. And those
involved in that debate must therefore work not only to shape doctrine
but, increasingly, to respect it.
This does not mean that the kinds of textual, historical, and
structural inquiries on display in Heller are no longer relevant. Second
Amendment doctrine can and sometimes does direct decisionmakers
back to first principles,11 as when determining whether concealed
carrying falls outside the scope of the Second Amendment because it
has historically been prohibited.12 But the scope and propriety of these
inquiries are increasingly circumscribed by precedent, which, as Justice
Benjamin Cardozo put it, “fix[es] the point of departure from which
the labor of the judge begins.”13 Precedent has a tendency to crowd out
other modalities of argument, such as those based on history.14 A
8. PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7, 93 (1982);
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991) (identifying text, history,
structure, precedent, consequences, and ethos as the “modalities” with which constitutional
argument is conducted).
9. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 95, 100 (2010) (“In general, interpretation recognizes or discovers the linguistic
meaning of an authoritative legal text.”); id. at 103 (“Conceptually, construction gives legal effect
to the semantic content of a legal text.”).
10. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 5 (2001) (observing
how judicial “design of implementing strategies” follows “the identification of constitutional
meaning”).
11. Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment Can
Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852, 861–63 (2013).
12. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (“[T]he majority of the
19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed
weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues.”); Peruta v. Cty. of San
Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 927 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“Based on the overwhelming consensus of
historical sources, we conclude that the protection of the Second Amendment—whatever the
scope of that protection may be—simply does not extend to the carrying of concealed firearms in
public by members of the general public.”); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir.
2010) (“This historical inquiry seeks to determine whether the conduct at issue was understood
to be within the scope of the right . . . .”).
13. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 20 (1921).
14. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher & Margaret Lemos, Practice and Precedent in Historical Gloss
Games, 106 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 5–8 (2017) (arguing that precedent generally displaces arguments
based on historical practice).
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federal court of appeals facing a novel Second Amendment question
might, for example, decline to follow the two-part test that “has
emerged as the prevailing approach.”15 But doing so would, at the very
least, call for an explanation.16
Understanding what Second Amendment doctrine is has
therefore never been more important.17 The project of this Article is to
facilitate such an understanding—one that includes not only the result
of every available Second Amendment opinion (state and federal, trial
and appellate) from the day Heller was decided until February 1,
2016,18 but also aspects of the judicial reasoning employed to justify
those results. In other words, we go beyond the results in Second
Amendment cases, considering their content as well.19 By analyzing
reasoning as well as outcomes, we can provide a more complete
account of the doctrine’s substance and development, while avoiding
some of the most central objections to case coding projects.20

15. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700
F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012); see, e.g., United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013);
United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller
II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 701–04 (7th Cir.
2011); Chester, 628 F.3d at 680; United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010). As we explain in more detail below,
infra notes 86–93, this two-step inquiry first asks whether the challenged regulation implicates the
Second Amendment at all, and, if so, whether it is justifiable in light of the individual burden and
the government interest being served.
16. See, e.g., Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Ill., 784 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2015)
(acknowledging Second Amendment doctrine applied by other circuits in challenges to assault
rifle bans and explaining deviation from it).
17. Mark A. Hall and Ronald F. Wright note that empirical content analysis of judicial
opinions “may not eliminate all disagreement, but at least it sharpens the issues,” and point as an
illustration to the use of content analysis “to challenge the emerging scholarly consensus that
promissory estoppel was overtaking consideration as the basis for enforcing contracts.” Mark A.
Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63,
85 (2008) (first citing Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the “New Consensus” on Promissory
Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580 (1998); then citing Juliet
P. Kostritsky, The Rise and Fall of Promissory Estoppel or Is Promissory Estoppel Really as
Unsuccessful as Scholars Say It Is: A New Look at the Data, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 531 (2002)).
18. As noted below, see infra note 114, we coded state trial court opinions, but omitted them
from the analysis because most state trial courts do not regularly publish opinions on Westlaw.
19. By content analysis, we simply mean the method by which “a scholar collects a set of
documents, such as judicial opinions on a particular subject, and systematically reads them,
recording consistent features of each and drawing inferences about their use and meaning.” Hall
& Wright, supra note 17, at 64.
20. Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that Attempt to
Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1926 (2009) (“A
final, and perhaps the most troubling, problem with coding decisions—and one well recognized
by many scholars who undertake empirical legal scholarship—is that only the outcomes of the
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Doing this meant identifying the proper set of Second
Amendment opinions, asking dozens of questions about each of them,
and analyzing the results. We designed questions to maximize
consistency and reliability, employed survey technology, trained
coders to review the cases, and conducted an independent quality
review.21 Past systematic reviews and consultations with an empiricist
played a central part of the process.22
Our goals are primarily descriptive and analytic.23 But positive and
normative analysis are unavoidably intertwined here, as in any area of
constitutional law. Case outcomes reveal, influence, and are shaped by
normative judgments about the Second Amendment’s proper purpose
and application. Second Amendment scholarship and commentary are
particularly riven with fundamental disagreements, some of which are
insoluble. There is no single way to interpret the twenty-seven words
of the Amendment, let alone the vast historical materials relating to
their meaning. That makes it all the more important to be clear about
the things that are measurable and subject to proof.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I establishes the stakes
and goals of the study. Part II describes the methodology. Parts III and
IV report and analyze the results. The Conclusion identifies major
takeaways and potential future avenues of research.

decisions are coded, not the content.”); Lee Epstein, Nancy Staudt & Peter Wiedenbeck, Judging
Statutes: Thoughts on Statutory Interpretation and Notes for a Project on the Internal Revenue
Code, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 305, 320–23 (2003) (advocating an approach that codes both
outcomes and content); Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Movement and the Qualitative
Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 885 (2008)
(concluding that empirical legal scholarship must “move beyond asking which litigant prevailed
in a case and now also ask how the advocates and the court framed the question presented and
how the legal analysis unfolded in the opinion”).
21. See infra Part II.
22. See, e.g., William Baude, Adam S. Chilton & Anup Malani, Making Doctrinal Work
More Rigorous: Lessons from Systematic Reviews, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 47–51 (2017); Hall &
Wright, supra note 17, at 64. Although we make no pretensions to having advanced the state of
the empirical art, our experience confirms the value of consulting existing scholarship for
methodological guidance. Hall & Wright, supra note 17, at 74 (noting that more than half of legal
scholars doing content analysis cited no methodological literature at all, and that “[i]n project
after project, legal researchers reinvent this methodological wheel on their own”); Peter J.
Hammer & William M. Sage, Antitrust, Health Care Quality, and the Courts, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
545, 560 (2002) (acknowledging a “tendency for each new enterprise to invent its own wheel, often
in a fairly ad hoc manner”). We found it particularly useful to learn how others have approached
questions of survey design, use and training of student coders, and reliability review.
23. Theodore Eisenberg, Why Do Empirical Legal Scholarship?, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1741, 1741 (2004) (concluding that empirical legal studies can “help[] inform litigants,
policymakers, and society as a whole about how the legal system works”).
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I. THE SECOND AMENDMENT COMES OF AGE
The contemporary Second Amendment is well-suited for
empirical study. For one thing, the right to keep and bear arms is
beginning to take shape—the decade since Heller has seen more than
one thousand lower court challenges testing the boundaries and
strength of the right.24 Moreover, the debate about gun rights and
regulation is still rife with broad but unsubstantiated claims about the
state of the law, often driven by rancor and partisanship. Close reading
and case coding can provide the kind of objective information that
might help discipline and professionalize the discussion.
A. From Should to Is: Why Claims about Second Amendment
Doctrine Matter
Ever since Heller, the debate about how the Second Amendment
should be interpreted and applied has necessarily involved claims
about how it is treated by the courts. Questions that were exclusively
the province of scholars and advocates less than a decade ago25 are now
being resolved by judges. Judicial opinions now address whether a ban
on “assault weapons” is constitutional,26 whether the right to keep and
bear arms extends outside the home,27 whether the Second
Amendment extends to people convicted of misdemeanor crimes of
domestic violence,28 and so on. As the doctrine comes into focus
through such opinions, claims by advocates, scholars, and others about
doctrinal content should become correspondingly more disciplined. As
we describe in Part I.B, such claims are made frequently, but are rarely
24. Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CALIF. L. REV.
1459, 1459 (2003) (arguing that circuit court decisions are “probably the decisions of greatest
importance for the development of the law in the United States”). See generally Doni
Gewirtzman, Lower Court Constitutionalism: Circuit Court Discretion in a Complex Adaptive
System, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 459–62 (2012) (describing how “lower federal court judges” are
“active players in the creation of constitutional meaning”).
25. See supra notes 5–10.
26. See, e.g., Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 121 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (finding that certain
semiautomatic rifles and high capacity magazines are not covered by the Second Amendment).
In keeping with common practice, we use the phrase “assault weapons,” recognizing that the label
is imprecise and frequently misunderstood.
27. Some have held as much. See, e.g., Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935–36 (7th Cir.
2012); Wrenn v. D.C., No. 16-7025, 2017 WL 3138111, at *3 (D.C. Cir. July 25, 2017). Others have
deferred the question, while upholding the challenged laws on other grounds. See, e.g., Drake v.
Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 430–32 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 875–76 (4th Cir.
2013); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 2012).
28. See, e.g., United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 2010) (upholding
federal ban); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 639 (7th Cir. 2010) (same).
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backed up by more than the commentator’s impressions. But they are,
in important ways, empirical statements, and can be evaluated as such.
Claiming that a federal Circuit is especially hostile to the Second
Amendment, for example, can be tested by measuring outcomes and
doctrine in that Circuit and comparing to others. But such analysis is
almost never done.
In the immediate wake of Heller—and, later, McDonald v. City of
Chicago29—judges, advocates, and commentators disagreed sharply
about the result and implications. Some predicted (happily or not) a
wave of litigation and a radical change to the nation’s firearm laws.30
Others suggested that the cases’ impact would be minimal, given the
paucity of laws as strict as those struck down in Heller and McDonald.31
There was, however, broad agreement that the Court had left
open many important and difficult questions regarding the scope and
protection of the right to keep and bear arms. At the same time as it
recognized the existence (and, later, fundamentality) of an individual
right to keep and bear arms for private purposes like self-defense in
the home, the Court also noted that this right, “[l]ike most rights, . . . is
not unlimited.”32 Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion explained:
From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators
and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep
and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for
whatever purpose. For example, the majority of the 19th-century
courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying
concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or
state analogues. Although we do not undertake an exhaustive
historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment,
nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally
ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such
as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.
We also recognize another important limitation on the right to

29. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
30. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 680 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“I fear that the District’s policy choice [that was struck down in Heller] may well be just the first
of an unknown number of dominoes to be knocked off the table.”).
31. See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1577 (2009) (“A few
additional extreme laws will be invalidated under the reinvigorated Second Amendment, but
these, like the D.C. law in Heller, are likely to be outliers.”).
32. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
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keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts
of weapons protected were those “in common use at the time.” We
think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of
prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.”33

These paragraphs were immediately and widely recognized as a key to
the constitutionality of gun regulation going forward.34
As expected, post-Heller litigation has focused on justifying,
limiting, extending, or reasoning by analogy from the restrictions that
the Court seemed to approve.35 There are, of course, deep debates
about where the lines should be drawn and how much of a burden the
government must bear in order to justify particular restrictions. The
debates are also methodological, involving questions like whether and
to what degree the analysis should depend on original review of the
historical record.36
But in addition to these arguments from first principles, advocates,
scholars, and judges are also making claims about the state of the
evolving doctrine. Heller essentially introduced a new constitutional
right, and recognized the wide range of questions it left open to future
cases.37 Subsequent decisions have answered some of those questions,
and have therefore provided further guidance and rules for future
cases. Just as lower courts are bound vertically by Supreme Court
precedent, they are also bound horizontally by their own. So when a
federal court of appeals holds that undocumented immigrants do not
33. Id. at 626–27 (citations omitted).
34. See, e.g., Winkler, supra note 31, at 1561 (“The vast majority of gun control laws fits
within these categories. So while forcefully declaring an individual right to keep and bear arms,
the Court suggests that nearly all gun control laws currently on the books are constitutionally
permissible.”).
35. See infra note 240 and accompanying text.
36. Compare Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding gun regulation under
intermediate scrutiny), with id. at 1271 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (concluding that “Heller and
McDonald leave little doubt that courts are to assess gun bans and regulations based on text,
history, and tradition, not by a balancing test such as strict or intermediate scrutiny,” and that the
laws at issue should be struck down); compare Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 431 (3d Cir. 2013)
(noting that the court was “not inclined to . . . engag[e] in a round of full-blown historical analysis”
regarding whether concealed carrying is covered by the Second Amendment), with id. at 449
(Hardiman, J., dissenting) (concluding on the basis of such an analysis that the “crux of [the]
historical precedents, endorsed by the Supreme Court, is that a prohibition against both open and
concealed carry without a permit is different in kind, not merely in degree, from a prohibition
covering only one type of carry”).
37. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (“[S]ince this case represents this Court’s first in-depth
examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire field . . . .
[T]here will be time enough to expound upon the historical justifications for the exceptions we
have mentioned if and when those exceptions come before us.”).
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fall within the Amendment’s scope, or that eighteen- to twenty-oneyear-olds do, it has also effectively determined the outcome of future
Second Amendment challenges in its circuit. And, considering the
degree to which courts borrow from one another’s tests, it has perhaps
even influenced cases outside its jurisdiction.38
As Second Amendment doctrine has begun to take shape and
solidify, advocates and scholars have begun to characterize it in general
terms. These claims are empirical in the sense that they are not
statements about what the law should be, but what it is. They are
therefore subject to proof in ways that normative claims about the
underlying purpose or meaning of the Amendment might not be.
These factual claims matter, as does their accuracy. Generally
speaking, falsifiable claims about the content of law should be true. In
this particular area of law, however, accuracy is especially important.
The post-Heller Second Amendment is no longer in its infancy, and
people are starting to form understandings of what Second
Amendment doctrine is all about. Those impressions, once formed, will
not be easy to shake.
And as a practical matter, such beliefs—accurate or not—can have
a major impact on the future of the Amendment. For example, gun
rights proponents regularly claim that lower courts are rejecting nearly
all Second Amendment challenges, refusing to apply Heller’s
reasoning, or that there is mass confusion in the lower courts.39 All of
these assertions are then invoked as reasons why the Court should
grant cert in another Second Amendment case.40
Such arguments can also be influential in the policy realm.
Politicians regularly make claims about the content of Second
Amendment doctrine,41 often suggesting that courts cannot be trusted
38. To take just one prominent example, the Third Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Marzzarella is credited as the first to describe the two-part test that has now been adopted across
the circuits:
First, we ask whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within
the scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee. If it does not, our inquiry is complete.
If it does, we evaluate the law under some form of means-end scrutiny. If the law passes
muster under that standard, it is constitutional. If it fails, it is invalid.
United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) (citing United States
v. Stevens, 533 F.3d 218, 233 (3d Cir. 2008), aff’d, 559 U.S. 460 (2010)); see N.Y. State Rifle &
Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 254 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016) (noting
that the two-part test had been largely adopted by the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth,
Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits).
39. See infra Part I.B.1.
40. See infra notes 75–78.
41. See, e.g., Senator Ted Cruz at 2017 Conservative Political Action Conference, C-SPAN
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to enforce the right to keep and bear arms42 or supporting state
constitutional amendments requiring strict scrutiny for gun rights
claims.43
It is not our goal to suggest that all of these claims are falsifiable
or that Second Amendment doctrine can be reduced to a single
doctrinal test or soundbite. No other constitutional right can be
described in such simplistic terms, and it would be too much (or too
little) to expect such of the right to keep and bear arms. But we think
it matters that some of these claims are subject to proof. And if Second
Amendment law, scholarship, and rhetoric are to be disciplined, then
they should be accurate.
We are not the first scholars to systematically review and analyze
lower court cases on the Second Amendment. Three prior projects in
particular demand close attention. Although none analyzes the same
breadth of cases as we do, and only one is quantitative, they each
represent welcome efforts to investigate Second Amendment doctrine
outside the Supreme Court.
In the first, Michael P. O’Shea reviews 225 federal appellate and
trial court opinions to determine “whether the right remains
underenforced.”44 If so, he argues, a slippery slope from background
check legislation to firearm confiscation is a plausible concern.45 He
observes that some judges provide institutional explanations for
(Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.c-span.org/video/?424394-8/senator-ted-cruz-speaks-cpac [https://
perma.cc/KLA5-2RHU] (04:36–08:30):
The Fourth Circuit used to be the most conservative court in the country. . . . . . .The
Fourth Circuit now, they invented this new test for the Second Amendment and here’s
what their test says: The Second Amendment doesn’t protect a weapon if it would be
useful in a military context. . . . This test isn’t just sort of questionable. It isn’t just a
little bit out there. It’s nuts. . . . This is lawless. And it’s why after eight years of Obama,
there are few if any things more important than putting principled constitutionalists on
the Supreme Court.
42. See, e.g., AWR Hawkins, Ted Cruz: U.S. Is One Liberal Justice Away From End of Gun
Rights, BREITBART (Oct. 25, 2015), http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/10/25/tedcruz-u-s-one-liberal-justice-away-end-gun-rights/ [https://perma.cc/88EM-3W3K].
43. See, e.g., ALA. POLICY INST., GUIDE TO THE ISSUES, STATEWIDE AMENDMENT 3: THE
RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 1 (2014) (“The driving force behind
Amendment 3 [requiring courts to apply strict scrutiny to gun restrictions] is the growing concern
at the federal level that courts have become more lenient and may back away from applying strict
scrutiny to Second Amendment challenges.”).
44. Michael P. O’Shea, The Steepness of the Slippery Slope: Second Amendment Litigation in
the Lower Federal Courts and What It Has to Do with Background Recordkeeping Legislation, 46
CONN. L. REV. 1381, 1410 (2014).
45. Id. at 1408 (“Courts that recognize and credibly enforce constitutional rights provide
assurance that legislation imposing additional regulation (A) will not be allowed to lead to drastic
or prohibitory restrictions (B) . . . .”).
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deferring to legislatures about public safety—a factor that can be
suggestive of underenforcement.46 In addition, though judges
nominated by both Republican and Democratic presidents have
upheld most gun laws, only Republican-nominated judges voted to
strike any down.47 (This pattern ceased soon after the end of the study
period.48) O’Shea concludes that the right is being underenforced,
thereby buttressing fears of a slippery slope.49
In a more recent review of federal appellate cases, David B. Kopel
and Joseph G.S. Greenlee describe doctrine being applied in
challenges to various categories of gun laws.50 Their analysis is more
normative, generally critiquing decisions perceived to under-enforce
the Second Amendment. Opinions upholding regulations in the face of
Second Amendment challenges are characterized as “deservedly
unpublished,”51
“willful[ly]
oblivious[]
to
the
facts,”52
53
“schizophrenic,” and applying an “eccentric and feeble version of
heightened scrutiny.”54 Opinions espousing a broad view of the Second
Amendment, most often dissents, are used to exemplify sound
doctrine.55
These first two articles might best be characterized as large-n
qualitative studies.56 Such qualitative analyses have the potential to

46. Id. at 1413 (citing Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of
Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1218–19 (1978)).
47. Id. at 1423–24. O’Shea notes one exception that confirms the rule: a former Republican
congressional staffer appointed by President Clinton as a compromise with Republicans. Id.
48. Id. at 1426–27 (counting three opinions in the months after the study period that
“deviated from the party-of-appointment pattern”).
49. Id. at 1425 (noting the “tenor” of decisions “is deeply skeptical, bordering on hostile, to
claims that the Second Amendment limits government action”).
50. David B. Kopel & Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The Federal Circuits’ Second Amendment
Doctrines, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 193, 196 (2017) (noting that the authors “examined every postHeller circuit case, including the unpublished ones”).
51. Id. at 254.
52. Id. at 298.
53. Id. at 299.
54. Id. at 268.
55. See id. at 206 (citing Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Ill., 784 F.3d 406, 417 (7th Cir.
2015) (Manion, J., dissenting)); id. at 265 (citing Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 445 (3d Cir. 2013)
(Hardiman, J., dissenting)); id. at 280 (citing United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1145, 1149
(9th Cir. 2013) (Bea, J., dissenting)); id. at 286 (citing Jackson v. City of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct.
2799, 2801 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)); id. at 301 (citing Heller II,
670 F.3d 1244, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)).
56. See generally Thomas M. Keck, Medium- and Large-N Qualitative Methods in
Constitutional Law, in HANDBOOK ON RESEARCH METHODS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(Malcolm Langford and David Law, eds. forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3070348
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capture the “normative influence of law” that is “difficult to capture in
statistical research designs.”57 But quantitative designs have their own
advantages, such as enabling comparisons between discrete variables
and limiting the subjectivity inherent in qualitative analysis.
A third review of Second Amendment case law employs
quantitative analysis and thus has methodological similarities to our
approach. Adam Samaha and Roy Germano compare federal
appellate success rates in five areas of constitutional litigation, one of
which is Second Amendment challenges.58 Samaha and Germano’s
goal is largely attitudinalist: they ask whether three proxies for judicial
ideology are predictive of outcomes.59 They conclude that ideology
“might play a small role” in resolving gun rights claims, but that the
correlation between ideology and outcomes appears much stronger in
cases involving abortion rights, the Establishment Clause, and
affirmative action.60 Samaha and Germano’s analysis also tees up
interesting questions about the state of Second Amendment litigation,
including how the high failure rate of Second Amendment claims can
be explained.61
We seek to create a more complete picture of the state of Second
Amendment case law. As described in greater detail in Part II, by
comprehensively coding all available state and federal trial and
appellate opinions, and counting nearly one hundred variables for each
Second Amendment challenge therein, we can provide the most
detailed account of Second Amendment doctrine to date. Like Samaha
and Germano, our approach is quantitative. Unlike them, however, we
make no effort to measure the impact of ideology.
B. Characterizing Second Amendment Doctrine
What, then, are the kinds of claims that are commonly made about
the content of Second Amendment doctrine? We see two major classes
of claims: broad characterizations of judicial treatment of the right to
keep and bear arms and more granular characterizations about
[https://perma.cc/ZWU4-WNS8] (describing methodology).
57. Id.
58. Adam M. Samaha & Roy Germano, Are Commercial Speech Cases Ideological? An
Empirical Inquiry, 25 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 827, 829 (2017).
59. Id. at 849–50 (describing the three proxies: (1) “political party of the appointing
president,” (2) “Judicial Common Space” scores, and (3) “Database on Ideology, Money in
Politics, and Elections” scores).
60. Id. at 861.
61. Id.
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doctrine.
1. Overall Characterizations. Perhaps the most widely accepted
characterization of Second Amendment challenges as a whole is that
they have been overwhelmingly rejected.62 As the Law Center to
Prevent Gun Violence puts it:
Regardless of the level of scrutiny that has been applied, nearly all
of these cases have one thing in common: [T]he Second Amendment
challenge has been rejected and the statute at issue has been upheld.
Of the more than 900 cases tracked by the Law Center, 96% have
rejected the Second Amendment challenge.63

Closely related to that overall assessment are characterizations
about regional variations. A common refrain has been that certain
federal appellate courts—especially the Second, Fourth, and Ninth
Circuits—are particularly opposed to enforcing the Second
Amendment right, suggesting a higher failure rate for challenges to gun
laws there than in other places.64 This characterization is often
accompanied by emphasis on the political makeup of the court under
discussion.65
However one defines success and failure,66 such claims depend in

62. Id. at 860 (characterizing Second Amendment challenges as “outstanding losers”).
63. LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, POST-HELLER LITIGATION SUMMARY 6 (Mar.
31, 2015), http://smartgunlaws.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Post-Heller-Litigation-SummaryMarch-2015-Final-Version.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5RC-ZC3E].
64. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 21, Silvester v. Harris, 843 F.3d 816 (9th Cir.
2016), petition for cert. filed sub nom., Silvester v. Becerra, No. 17-342 2017 WL 3948480 (U.S.
Sept. 1, 2017) (No. 17-342) (“It is no secret that various lower courts, and the Ninth Circuit
especially, are engaged in systematic resistance to this Court’s Heller and McDonald decisions.”);
AWR Hawkins, President Trump Can Free Second Amendment From Ninth Circuit’s Grip,
BREITBART (Jan. 3, 2017), http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2017/01/03/presidenttrump-can-free-2nd-amendment-ninth-circuits-grip/ [https://perma.cc/GUA7-FYG6] (singling
out the Ninth Circuit as “chipping away at the Second Amendment”); Daniel Horowitz, 4th
Circuit Limits Second Amendment Right to Own Common Firearms, CONSERVATIVE REV. (Feb.
22, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.conservativereview.com/commentary/2017/02/fourth-circuitlimits-second-am endment-right-to-possess-common-firearms
[https://perma.cc/E5GE-H9J9];
David Kopel, The 2nd Circuit’s Second-Class Second Amendment Intermediate Scrutiny, WASH.
POST (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/10/23/
the-2nd-circuits-second-class-second-amendment-intermediate-scrutiny [http://perma.cc/ZW7ZRFD] (suggesting that the Second Circuit is applying a uniquely deferential version of scrutiny to
uphold gun laws against Second Amendment challenges).
65. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 64.
66. As explained in more detail below, infra notes 136–40 and accompanying text, we focus
on the failure rate, counting as a “success” any challenge that is not rejected, including those that
simply survive a motion for summary judgment or motion to dismiss. Such claims might ultimately
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part on facts. As we note below, it is true that the vast majority of
Second Amendment claims fail, but it is also true that the Second,
Fourth, and Ninth Circuits—those typically criticized as being hostile
to gun rights—upheld Second Amendment claims at a higher rate than
the overall average.67 Moreover, the meaning and significance of
failure rates, including whether Second Amendment claims are being
treated fairly by courts, also depends in part on empirical facts. Is the
failure rate high because so many objectively weak claims are
brought—for example, by people who Heller carves out of Second
Amendment coverage, but who have nothing to lose by raising
constitutional claims, like convicted felons-in-possession? (We find the
answer to be a partial yes.68) Or, in contrast, are there indicia that the
failure rate is high because judges are hostile to the right to keep and
bear arms?
The latter has become a central talking point for many who favor
broad gun rights.69 Indeed, it is perhaps the most common argument in
favor of granting cert in another Second Amendment case. In
McDonald, the plurality opinion noted that the Second Amendment is
not a “second-class right.”70 Judges, advocates, and scholars frequently
invoke that language in the course of suggesting that a particular court
has interpreted the right to keep and bear arms too narrowly.71 Perhaps
fail in a later opinion. In that case, the earlier case outcome (say, surviving a motion to dismiss)
would be coded as a success and the later outcome would be coded as a failure.
67. See infra Table 1 (showing overall success rate of 9 percent) and Table 2 (showing that
Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have higher success rates).
68. See infra Part III.A.2 (finding that nearly two thirds of challenges are brought by criminal
defendants, who have a success rate of only 6 percent) and Part III.A.3 and Appendix C,
https://dlj.law.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/04/Ruben-and-Blocher-App-C-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9PQG-7WY6] (showing that out of that 273 challenges to felon-in-possession
statutes—nearly a quarter of the set—just three succeeded, for a 1 percent success rate).
69. See, e.g., Robert J. Cottrol & George A. Mocsary, Guns, Bird Feathers, and
Overcriminalization: Why Courts Should Take the Second Amendment Seriously, 14 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 17, 33 (2016) (arguing that lower courts are “undercutting . . . Supreme Court
precedent” in a way that is suggestive of “something other than a desire to control crime”);
O’Shea, supra note 44, at 1425 (characterizing the “tenor” of lower court Second Amendment
decisions as “deeply skeptical, bordering on hostile, to claims that the Second Amendment limits
government action”); Editorial, Waiting for Justice Gorsuch, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 23, 2017, 7:17 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/waiting-for-justice-gorsuch-1487893991
[https://perma.cc/VCU6SBYS] (postulating a “lower-court assault on gun rights”); Charles C.W. Cooke, The Fourth
Circuit Runs Roughshod Over Heller and the Second Amendment, NAT’L REV. (Feb. 22, 2017,
2:19
PM),
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/445145/fourth-circuit-decision-marylandassault-weapons-ban-constitutional-travesty [https://perma.cc/349K-XLAC] (suggesting “the
Fourth Circuit has taken it upon itself to rewrite Heller”).
70. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010) (plurality).
71. It is, for example, the first line of the en banc dissent in Peruta v. County of San Diego,
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most prominently, Justice Clarence Thomas has repeatedly suggested
that the Second Amendment is being subject to second-class treatment:
he has done so not only in opinions72 and dissents from denials of
certiorari,73 but in his first questions at oral argument in nearly a
decade.74
Dozens of briefs have invoked the same “second class” language,
often as a means of pressing the Supreme Court to grant cert.75 And as
one would expect with cert petitions, which typically aim to show more
than simply the existence of an erroneous decision,76 those briefs have
often made the broader empirical claim that the error is widely
replicated.77 A brief filed by dozens of members of Congress is

824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc): “The Second Amendment is not a ‘second-class’
constitutional guarantee.” Id. at 945 (Callahan, J., dissenting).
72. Voisine v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2272, 2292 (2016) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“In
construing the statute before us expansively so that causing a single minor reckless injury or
offensive touching can lead someone to lose his right to bear arms forever, the Court continues
to ‘relegat[e] the Second Amendment to a second-class right.’” (quoting Friedman v. City of
Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 450 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari))).
73. Silvester v. Becerra, No. 17-342, 2018 WL 943032, at 8* (U.S. Feb. 20, 2018) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“The right to keep and bear arms is apparently this Court’s
constitutional orphan.”); Peruta v. California, 137 S. Ct. 1995, 1999 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (“The Court’s decision to deny certiorari in this case reflects a
distressing trend: the treatment of the Second Amendment as a disfavored right.”); Friedman, 136
S. Ct. at 450 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“I would grant certiorari to prevent
the Seventh Circuit from relegating the Second Amendment to a second-class right.”).
74. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35–39, Voisine, 136 S. Ct. 2272 (No. 14-10154); Josh
Blackman, Justice Thomas Speaks Truth To Power: Second Amendment Is Not a Second-Class
Right, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Mar. 1, 2016), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2016/03/01/justicethomas-speaks-truth-to-power-second-amendment-is-not-a-second-class-right/
[https://perma.cc/FCC7-VVNF] (referring to a “rank double standard” and concluding that
“Thomas’s questions from the bench are meant to illicit [sic] the subjugation of the Second
Amendment”).
75. See, e.g., Brief for National Rifle Association of America as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 22, Walker v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2387 (2016) (No. 15-1027) (“The rights
secured by the Second Amendment are not second-class rights, and this Court should grant
certiorari to ensure that they are not relegated to that disfavored status.” (citation omitted)); Brief
for the American Civil Rights Union as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 4, Kachalsky v.
Cacace, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013) (No. 12-845) (“The court below also embraced stepchild, second
class status for the Second Amendment, contrary to both Heller and McDonald.”).
76. SUP. CT. R. 10 (listing factors for certiorari, including existence of a circuit split or
important question of federal law); id. (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when
the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated
rule of law.”).
77. See, e.g., Petitioners’ Reply Brief at 2, Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 136 S. Ct. 1486
(2016) (No. 15-746) (“This Court’s review is further warranted because the deferential form of
intermediate scrutiny applied by the panel majority below is inconsistent with this Court’s
precedents regarding how infringements on fundamental rights are analyzed and demonstrates
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representative:
Unfortunately, such second-class treatment of the Second
Amendment pervades the lower courts. Purported judicial restraint
in the form of extreme deference to legislative action is flatly at odds
with Heller, McDonald, and indeed all decisions involving the
protection of fundamental individual rights against majoritarian
impulses. The Court must act to ensure that citizens have a means of
enforcing their individual right to keep and bear arms when legislative
bodies infringe that right.78

The suggestion is that resolving the particular case on appeal could
have far-reaching benefits by addressing an objectionable doctrinal
trend.
To be clear, these arguments are not purely empirical. Saying that
a right is systematically underenforced involves at least two steps: a
conclusion about how stringently it should be enforced, and an
assessment of how it actually is enforced in practice. Parties in the gun
debate disagree about both of these things, but our focus in this Article
is the latter. In other words, we do not purport to resolve whether
upholding a federal ban on eighteen- to twenty-year-olds buying
handguns equates to “second-class” treatment of the Second
Amendment right.79 Our goal is to help evaluate whether such a
holding represents any part of a trend. Moreover, we consider other
objective factors that bear on the question, including those that reflect
the strength or weakness of a claim and the seriousness with which a
judge considered it. The end result is a more empirically-grounded
baseline with which to evaluate claims of underenforcement.
Of course, any discussion of the proper degree of enforcement will
always have a normative dimension. Consider, for example, the more
radical version of the “second class” argument—the suggestion that
how the lower courts are turning the Second Amendment into a second-class right.”); Petition for
Writ of Certiorari at 12, Jackson v. City of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 2799 (2014) (No. 14-704)
(“[E]ven after this Court’s admonishment that the Second Amendment may not ‘be singled out
for special—and specially unfavorable—treatment,’ courts continue to do just that. Whether
through summary reversal or plenary review, this Court should use this opportunity to put an end
to this disturbing trend.” (citation omitted) (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742,
778–79 (2010))).
78. Brief for Members of Congress as Amici Curiae Supporting the Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 4–5, Drake v. Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014) (No. 13-827).
79. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 3, Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. McCraw, 134 S. Ct. 1365 (2014)
(No. 13-390) (“We urge this Court to grant review in this case both to reaffirm that the Second
Amendment’s guaranty is not a ‘second-class’ fundamental right and to establish that responsible,
law-abiding 18-to-20-year-old adults are not second-class citizens.”).
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lower courts are engaging in a campaign of “massive resistance” to gun
rights, a phrase made famous by white segregationists opposing school
integration and now frequently invoked to describe the courts’
treatment of the Second Amendment.80 The appropriateness of this
analogy cannot be evaluated solely by empirics, but depends also on
one’s belief about how the Second Amendment right should be
treated.81
But such characterizations gain strength and relevance from the
suggestion that they represent a snapshot of broader case law, not least
because the Court is far more likely to intervene to correct a common
error than a narrow one. It thus matters when briefs and commentators
suggest that “lower courts” are “attempting to eradicate the Second
Amendment.”82 Eventually, those claims find their way to the Justices,
as in Justices Thomas and Scalia’s dissent from certiorari in Jackson v.
City of San Francisco, which arose out of the Ninth Circuit:
Despite the clarity with which we described the Second
Amendment’s core protection for the right of self-defense, lower
courts, including the ones here, have failed to protect it. Because
Second Amendment rights are no less protected by our Constitution

80. This claim has been made in briefs, scholarship, and major editorials. See, e.g., Petition
for Writ of Certiorari at 24, Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447 (2015) (No. 15133); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Jerejian, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (No. 13-827) (describing “lower
courts’ massive resistance to Heller”); Alice Marie Beard, Resistance by Inferior Courts to
Supreme Court’s Second Amendment Decisions, 81 TENN. L. REV. 673, 673 (2014) (“In the wake
of the Supreme Court’s District of Columbia v. Heller (‘Heller I’) and McDonald v. Chicago
decisions that clarify, expand, and protect Second Amendment rights, federal and state inferior
courts have been engaging in massive resistance.” (citations omitted)); Editorial, Massive Gun
Resistance, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 12, 2013, 6:38 PM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424
127887324600704578402760760473582 [https://perma.cc/YQ7N-UJ5E]. Sometimes, comparisons
are explicitly made between post-Heller developments in gun rights and the struggle for racial
equality after Brown v. Board of Education. See Alan Gura, The Second Amendment as a Normal
Right, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 223, 224 (2014); David B. Kopel, Does the Second Amendment
Protect Firearms Commerce?, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 230, 230 (2014).
81. Joseph Blocher, Good Cause Requirements for Carrying Guns in Public, 127 HARV. L.
REV. F. 218, 218 n.1 (2014) (pointing to the differing political power of contemporary gun owners
and black schoolchildren in the 1950s).
82. Brief for National Rifle Association of America as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners
for Writ of Certiorari at 16, Friedman, 136 S. Ct. 447 (No. 15-133) (“Rather than perform their
duty to enforce the Constitution, lower courts are attempting to eradicate the Second
Amendment by disregarding the Bill of Rights and the precedents of this Court.”); Josh
Blackman, Justice Thomas: Second Amendment Is Not a ‘Second-Class Right,’ NAT’L REV. (Dec.
8, 2015, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/428173/justice-thomas-secondamendment-not-second-class-right-josh-blackman [https://perma.cc/DEP4-K9LA] (“By refusing
to intervene when lower courts disregard the right to keep and bear arms, the Supreme Court has
done exactly what Chicago wanted, and abdicated this cornerstone of the Bill of Rights.”).
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than other rights enumerated in that document, I would have granted
this petition.83

Whether “lower courts . . . have failed to protect” Heller’s right is
a foundation of this argument, and empirical study can help determine
whether that foundation is sound. We can measure the proportion of
cases in which litigants challenge policies that Heller suggested fell
outside the bounds of Second Amendment coverage, determine if a
given court is handling categories of Second Amendment claims
differently than others, compare appeal rates and success rates to those
in other areas of litigation, evaluate proxies for whether judges are
giving serious consideration to Second Amendment claims, and so on.
Such measures, while not perfect, provide a better basis for broad
Second Amendment claims than intuition or cherry-picked case law.
2. Claims About the Content of the Law. In addition to broad
characterizations about how cases are being decided, scholars,
advocates, and even judges have begun to characterize the content of
the emerging law. Some advocates, taking the same basic tack as the
“second class” line of argument, suggest that the lower courts are
“deeply divided” over the applicable standards,84 or that “there is great
confusion in the lower courts on the meaning of Heller’s ‘presumptively
lawful regulatory measures.’”85
Although it may still be true that “[t]he federal judiciary has taken
only the first steps in developing Second Amendment jurisprudence,”86
there is wide agreement about what those first steps should be.
Commentators have, for example, noted that “the most common
framework is a two-pronged inquiry that first asks whether a
challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the scope of
the Second Amendment, and, second, if it does, whether the law
satisfies the applicable level of scrutiny.”87 Courts, advocates, and
83. Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 2799, 2799–2800 (2015) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
84. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 37, Friedman, 136 S. Ct. 447 (No. 15-133) (“The better
part of a decade after this Court’s landmark decision in Heller, the lower courts remain deeply
divided over how to assess Second-Amendment claims, and that confusion poses a serious threat
to liberty.”).
85. Petitioners’ Reply Brief at 3, Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 136 S. Ct. 1486 (2016) (No. 15746).
86. Kenneth A. Klukowski, Making Second Amendment Law with First Amendment Rules:
The Five-Tier Free Speech Framework and Public Forum Doctrine in Second Amendment
Jurisprudence, 93 NEB. L. REV. 429, 433 (2014).
87. LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 63, at 3.
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scholars generally agree that some version of the two-part test
predominates throughout the lower courts.88
There remains substantial disagreement about how those two
steps play out in practice. In applying the first step, some courts take a
deeply historical approach, looking to whether a challenged regulation
is one of the “presumptively lawful” regulatory measures mentioned in
Heller,89 or whether “the record includes persuasive historical evidence
establishing that the regulation at issue imposes prohibitions that fall
outside the historical scope of the Second Amendment.”90 Some
commentators, however, have concluded that “originalism has had a
limited role in post-Heller Second Amendment litigation.”91
As for the second stage of the two-step test, many scholars and
advocates agree (some celebrate, while others bemoan) that lower
courts “have effectively embraced the sort of interest-balancing
approach that Justice Scalia condemned, adopting an intermediate
scrutiny test and applying it in a way that is highly deferential to
legislative determinations and that leads to all but the most drastic
restrictions on guns being upheld.”92 The alleged permissiveness of this
second step is of particular concern to litigants challenging gun laws,
who argue that “[t]he very fact that a court reaches the second step all
88. See Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700
F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) (“A two-step inquiry has emerged as the prevailing approach . . . .”);
see also N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 254 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 2486 (2016) (noting that the two-part test had been largely adopted by the Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits).
89. Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 2799 (2015).
90. Id. (citing, with approval, United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2013)).
91. Lawrence Rosenthal, The Limits of Second Amendment Originalism and the
Constitutional Case for Gun Control, 92 WASH. U.L. REV. 1187, 1200 (2015) (“The emerging
consensus in the lower courts uses original meaning only as a threshold test, which screens out
some claims, but contemplates that laws—even those limiting the extent to which individuals can
exercise the textually recognized right to keep and bear arms—may be sustained upon sufficient
justification.”); Eric M. Ruben, Justifying Perceptions in First and Second Amendment Doctrine,
80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 163 (2017) (“[O]riginalism has not been the primary means of
deciding cases.”).
92. Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle Over the Second Amendment,
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 706–07 (2012); see Brief of Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc. et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10, Jackson, 135 S. Ct. at 2799 (No. 14-704) (“De Facto
Interest-Balancing Is Now The Prevailing Rule In The Lower Courts.”); Brief of Members of
Congress, supra note 78, at 10 (criticizing “the prevailing, nearly automatic application of
‘intermediate scrutiny’”); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20, District of
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290) (arguing that, “[l]ike rights conferred by
surrounding provisions of the Bill of Rights, the individual right guaranteed by the Second
Amendment is subject to reasonable restrictions and important exceptions”).
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but guarantees that the challenged law will survive.”93
For present purposes, what interests us is not the normative
valence of these claims—for example, that the Second Amendment is
underprotected, or that the Supreme Court should grant cert again—
but rather their factual predicates: that courts are, in fact, rejecting the
vast majority of Second Amendment claims, that they are applying
divergent methodologies, that historical argument is or is not crucial in
resolving those claims, and so on.
C. Measuring Doctrine
Doctrinally, our focus is the Second Amendment. But we hope
that our efforts also reflect and contribute to broader debates about
content analysis and rigor in doctrinal scholarship.
Content analysis of law is not novel. In “Systematic Content
Analysis of Judicial Opinions,” Mark A. Hall and Ronald F. Wright
conclude that the practice—albeit not named as such—is decades old
and, at its best, “brings the rigor of social science to our understanding
of case law, creating a distinctively legal form of empiricism.”94 Hall
and Wright review 134 legal content analyses published between
January 1, 1998 and June 30, 2006, in an effort to “describe past
practices and to point the way to a better future.”95 They find that such
studies have evaluated a broad range of legal subject areas, including
“administrative law, constitutional law, corporate and securities law,
criminal law and procedure, contracts, employment discrimination,
health law, and torts.”96
And yet, despite the frequency with which scholars, lawyers, and
judges make falsifiable claims about the content of legal doctrine, the
state of the scholarly art rarely demands more than a “See, e.g.,” signal
followed by three case citations. As Will Baude, Adam Chilton, and
Anup Malani note, nearly half of the articles published in one volume
of the top ten law reviews included a claim about the state of legal
doctrine in the abstract, but only 25 percent of those articles provided

93. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25, Jackson, 135 S. Ct. 2799 (No. 14-704); id. at 20
(“Time and again, courts have used this open-ended inquiry to constrain the scope of the Second
Amendment by deeming everything other than the precise conduct at issue in Heller outside its
‘core.’ And even if laws burden conduct within that core, anything less than a complete ban is
deemed ‘only a minimal burden.’”).
94. Hall & Wright, supra note 17, at 64.
95. Id. at 66; see also id. at 70–71 & n.29.
96. Id. at 73 (citations omitted).
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any form of systematic review to support the doctrinal claim.97 Even
those articles that seek to employ content analysis have yet to develop
anything like a set of best practices. As a result, Peter Hammer and
William Sage’s observation likely remains true fifteen years later: this
is “a confused area of legal scholarship, with few clear norms or
standards to guide researchers.”98
It is not hard to imagine why content analysis has not yet played a
more prominent role in legal scholarship. Case coding does not come
naturally to doctrinal scholars, and it requires an unfamiliar toolkit. As
we explain in detail below, even the most cautious and rigorous coding
project will involve difficult judgment calls and serious caveats.
Moreover, some scholarly goals are not well suited to the approach.
But for those that are—including, we think, mapping the content of
Second Amendment doctrine—the benefits are considerable.99
Content analysis should generally be distinguished from projects
that seek to understand judicial behavior. Our focus here is on
doctrine, not judges, and our goals are not attitudinalist. We therefore
make no attempt to show whether, for example, judicial votes can be
explained by judicial ideology.100
II. METHODOLOGY
Our goal was to conduct a comprehensive analysis of post-Heller
Second Amendment cases. Getting there involved six stages: selecting
the dataset, constructing the survey, defining key variables, coding the

97. Baude, Chilton & Malani, supra note 22, at 40; see also Kay L. Levine, The Law Is Not
the Case: Incorporating Empirical Methods into the Culture of Case Analysis, 17 U. FLA. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 283, 284 (2006) (“Can anyone know the state of the law from reading a handful of
select cases?”).
98. Hammer & Sage, supra note 22, at 560.
99. Hall and Wright conclude that content analysis is a powerful way to “identify surface
patterns” and “verify or refute descriptions of case law that are based on more anecdotal or
subjective study.” Hall & Wright, supra note 17, at 99–100.
100. The attitudinalist project has spawned its own meta-literature of critique, one major fault
line of which lies between the positive and normative. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Chemerinsky &
Jonathan L. Williams, Foreword: Measuring Judges and Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1173, 1173–74
(2009) (introducing symposium focused on evaluating and critiquing quantitative measurements
of judicial behavior). Many critics argue that empirical scholarship about judges should focus on
what judges do in practice, rather than characterizing them as “political” or not. Michael Boudin,
A Response to Professor Ramseyer, Predicting Court Outcomes through Political Preferences, 58
DUKE L.J. 1687, 1688–89 (2009) (cautioning against the use of “political”); David F. Levi,
Autocrat of the Armchair, 58 DUKE L.J. 1791, 1795, 1795 n.15 (2009) (same); H. Jefferson Powell,
A Response to Professor Knight, Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions About Judicial
Decisionmaking?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1725, 1725–26 (2009) (same).
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opinions, reviewing for reliability, and analyzing the data.101 This Part
explains the first five stages, as well as limitations and advantages of
our methodology. Readers who are primarily interested in the survey
results and analysis can turn to Parts III and IV.
A. Data Selection
Our final dataset includes 997 opinions issued between June 26,
2008, the date Heller was decided, and February 1, 2016, the date we
ran our final search. Some litigants challenged more than one law or
policy in a single case;102 as a result, the 997 opinions address 1,153
distinct Second Amendment challenges. We analyze the challenges,
not the opinions as a whole.
The end date, while selected initially because it happened to be
the time we were ready to begin work, turns out to correspond almost
exactly with the period of Second Amendment development between
Heller and Justice Antonin Scalia’s passing on February 13, 2016.
Perhaps more than any other constitutional issue, the future of the
Second Amendment was a flashpoint in the debate over Justice Scalia’s
replacement.103 After all, Heller has been characterized as Scalia’s
“legacy,” the “most important [opinion] in his 22 years on the court,”
and “easily the most significant opinion Scalia has written.”104 But often
lost in the debate is the fact that, even while Justice Scalia was on the
bench, the Supreme Court refused to intervene in more than sixty postHeller Second Amendment cases, leaving doctrinal development
primarily to the lower courts. Those courts, in turn, might have been

101. Substantively, these six stages are the same as the three “components” described by Hall
and Wright. Hall & Wright, supra note 17, at 79 (“There are three distinct components of content
analysis: (1) selecting cases; (2) coding cases; and (3) analyzing the case coding, often through
statistical methods.”).
102. To be exact, eighty-four opinions decided more than one Second Amendment challenge.
103. The reaction about the future of Second Amendment jurisprudence came almost
immediately after Justice Scalia’s passing. The very next day, Senator Ted Cruz defended delaying
the confirmation of the next Justice, noting “[w]e are one justice away from the Second
Amendment being written out of the constitution altogether.” Matt Flegenheimer, The Death of
Justice Scalia: Reactions and Analysis, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
live/supreme-court-justice-antonin-scalia-dies-at-79/cruz-we-are-one-justice-away-from-thesecond-amendment-being-written-out-of-the-constitution/ [https://perma.cc/2S4S-SDXT]. But
see Joseph Blocher, Scalia’s Gun Rights Legacy Is Likely to Stand, No Matter Who Replaces Him,
TRACE (Feb. 15, 2016), https://www.thetrace.org/2016/02/antonin-scalia-legacy-gun-rights/ [https:
//perma.cc/Q3LJ-AYFE]. In any event, President Donald Trump’s election and the confirmation
of Justice Gorsuch have almost certainly rendered the point moot for the meantime.
104. ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN
AMERICA 281 (2011) (collecting quotes) (citations omitted).
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responding in part to Justice Scalia’s presence on the Court.105
Many empirical studies require, as a practical matter, the selection
of a subset from a prohibitively large population, which opens the door
to selection bias.106 Fortunately, the universe of post-Heller opinions
was small enough to be reviewed in toto, allowing us to avoid that
problem.
Nevertheless, we still needed to decide whether to target state or
federal courts and trial or appellate courts. Analyzing cases from both
state and federal courts—which no post-Heller review of Second
Amendment case law has done—enables a comparison of how the two
systems have handled Second Amendment claims. We thought that
exercise might be instructive for at least two reasons. First, it would
allow us to see if federal courts were less receptive to Second
Amendment challenges than state courts. Second, state courts have
had more than a century of experience deciding right-to-keep-andbear-arms cases under state constitutional amendments, but have
generally applied a different standard than the two-step test ultimately
adopted by most federal circuits.107
We also saw a benefit in reviewing opinions from both trial and
appellate courts. If our project were solely to count final outcomes,
reviewing trial court in addition to appellate court decisions would
unnecessarily double-count some cases. But we also wanted to evaluate
and compare judicial reasoning. How trial courts explain their Second
Amendment decisions is relevant to that evaluation. We therefore
decided to cast the net as broadly as possible, reviewing available
Second Amendment opinions on Westlaw—both formally published in
official reporters and not—from every jurisdiction and every tier of the
court system.108

105. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Georg Vanberg, Judicial Retirements and the Staying Power of
U.S. Supreme Court Decisions, 13 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUDS. 5, 5 (2016) (finding that negative
treatments of Supreme Court opinions increase when Justices who supported the opinions retire).
106. Hall & Wright, supra note 17, at 102.
107. For a description of the “reasonableness” standard used in most state cases, see generally
Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683 (2007). The standard
applied in post-Heller Second Amendment cases is described supra notes 86–93 and
accompanying text.
108. Westlaw’s “All State Cases” database includes “all available cases from state
jurisdictions with coverage beginning in 1658.” State Cases Scope Information, WESTLAW
https://1.next.westlaw.com/Browse/Home/Cases/StateCases?transitionType=Default&contextD
ata=(sc.Default)# (emphasis added). As we explain below, infra note 114 and accompanying text,
Westlaw contains a spotty collection of state trial court opinions. The Westlaw collection of state
appellate court opinions is much more comprehensive, though we emphasize that the scope of
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To isolate those opinions, we conducted a search in Westlaw109:
advanced: “second amendment” & (arms OR “district #of columbia
v. heller” OR firearm!) & DA(aft 06-25-2008 & bef 02-02-2016)110

Our search terms were the result of a process of trial and error that
sought to capture all of the relevant opinions while omitting false
positives. For example, the term “second amendment” returned more
than four thousand opinions, but many of them had nothing to do with
the Second Amendment.111 Our final search terms returned more than
2,200 opinions.112 A quick review revealed overbreadth—some

our dataset is constrained by Westlaw’s collection, which in turn was constrained by the universe
of “available” opinions. Id. For more discussion of limitations of our dataset, see infra note 111
and Part II.F.
109. Some organizations maintain lists of post-Heller Second Amendment opinions.
However, we chose not to use a premade list to ensure consistency and avoid any semblance of
bias. We also decided not to use Westlaw’s own coding system. Westlaw tags Second Amendment
opinions with a unique identifier (“U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 2”), as it does for opinions discussing
other Amendments. Westlaw also utilizes topic identifiers and “key numbers” suggestive of
Second Amendment challenges. Our initial review of the cases containing Westlaw’s identifiers,
however, revealed significant omissions. After consulting with a Westlaw reference attorney, we
opted to use our own search terms.
110. Initially, one required search term was “constitution,” but we subsequently decided that
term was unduly restrictive, so we reran the search without “constitution.” Because we decided
to rerun the search after coding was underway, our dataset is separated into two mutually
exclusive halves: one with opinions containing “constitution!” and the other without that term.
111. The words “second amendment” appear in various contexts, including discussions of a
“second amendment” to a complaint or contract. See, e.g., Oakes v. United Home Life Ins., No.
3:15cv242-MHT, 2015 WL 5234945, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 8, 2015) (discussing a “second
amendment” to complaint); Dollar Tree Stores Inc. v. Toyama Partners LLC, Nos. C 10–0325 SI,
C 11–2696 SI, 2011 WL 3295420, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011) (mentioning a “second
amendment” to contract). Thus, we sought to limit our search by adding additional required
words. In addition to “second amendment,” most post-Heller Second Amendment cases we
reviewed also referenced either Heller or the “right to keep and bear arms,” so we added a
requirement that opinions include either “arms” or “district of columbia v. heller.” When we
conducted our initial quality review, however, we found a few Second Amendment opinions
referencing neither term. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Leverone, 31 N.E.3d 1192 (Table), 2015 WL
3539763 (Mass. App. Ct. June 5, 2015), review denied, 36 N.E.3d 30 (Mass. App. Ct. 2015). Those
few opinions did, however, include “firearm” or “firearms,” so we added “firearm!” to the search.
Of course, the Second Amendment is potentially implicated by other types of “arms,” such as
knives. Since the addition of “firearm!” only captured the odd opinion that did not mention
“arms” or “district of columbia v. heller,” we were content adding “firearm!” as a search term
without adding terms for every other type of weapon we could imagine.
112. This figure includes cases from two Westlaw databases: the main database of published
opinions and a separate database of trial court orders. Of course, relying on Westlaw meant that
we did not include opinions that were not loaded into Westlaw by the time we ran our search. We
are aware of one opinion, Baker v. Kealoha, No. 1:11-cv-00528-ACK-KSC, 2012 WL 12886818
(D. Haw. Apr. 30, 2012), vacated, 679 F. App’x. 625 (9th Cir. 2017), which would have been
returned by our search terms, but was added to the Westlaw database on February 21, 2017. This
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opinions containing the search terms did not have a Second
Amendment holding, as we defined it113—but we opted to err on the
side of inclusiveness rather than risk omitting Second Amendment
cases. As described below, coders manually removed false positives
and duplicates.
Unfortunately, the subset of state trial court opinions was woefully
incomplete. Most state trial court decisions do not result in published
opinions that are submitted to Westlaw. As a result, the dataset
included 441 state appellate court challenges, but just forty-two state
trial court challenges.114 We therefore decided to omit state trial court
opinions, resulting in a final dataset of 997 opinions that included 1,153
Second Amendment challenges.
B. Survey Construction
Once we had a dataset, we needed a mechanism to consistently
code it. To do this, we created a survey that would capture the variables
we hoped to test.115 Those variables included case caption information
(for example, judge names, jurisdiction, identity of plaintiff or
defendant), procedural posture (that is, motion to dismiss, summary
judgment, and so on), factual information (for example, law being
challenged), outcome (whether the Second Amendment claim
failed),116 and aspects of the judicial reasoning justifying the outcome
(as in reliance on historical analysis or tiered scrutiny). The survey
contained ninety questions for each challenge in each Second
Amendment opinion, though some questions are conditioned on
answers to previous questions. For example, each category of gun
restriction at issue would prompt certain subquestions. The broad
range of questions allowed us to gather granular information for each
case. Moreover, by measuring reliability, we could draw conclusions
about survey design that hopefully will assist future systematic reviews.
Some of the questions are designed to be objective proxies for
potentially subjective concepts. For example, we asked whether the
opinion was not coded and is not part of our analysis. It is possible that other responsive opinions
were similarly backfilled.
113. See infra Part II.C.
114. The only state that seems to regularly submit trial court opinions to Westlaw is New
York, which accounts for twenty-three of the forty-one state trial court opinions we collected.
115. A copy of our survey is included as Appendix A, https://dlj.law.duke.edu/wpcontent/uploads/sites/2/2018/04/Ruben-and-Blocher-App.-A.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A6DW29YL].
116. See infra Part II.C.
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Second Amendment discussion was three or fewer paragraphs—a
fairly objective measure. If it was, one might fairly say that the analysis
was conclusory, which is a more subjective concept.117 Similarly, we
asked whether the court cited historical sources from various time
periods as a way to measure the degree to which its analysis was
originalist. But some aspects of a judge’s reasoning necessarily require
inference on the part of the reader; a judge might, for example, apply
intermediate scrutiny without expressly saying so. Like anyone relying
on the text of legal opinions, we are somewhat constrained by what
courts say they are doing.118
To avoid inconsistency in the responses to more evaluative
questions, we engaged in a lengthy process of drafting, testing, and
revising our questions.119 When we arrived at a near-final survey, we
tested it by asking three independent coders to code the same ten cases.
We chose the ten cases to reflect the range of complex opinions we
believed coders would encounter in the full dataset. We then compared
results. After making a few adjustments based on our review and
feedback we received, we were ready to move on to the next steps:
making some definitional choices, training the coders, and coding the
dataset.120
C. Defining Variables
Any case coding project requires some forethought into how
variables should be understood by the coders and, later, by the

117. Other studies have similarly relied on the amount of text devoted to certain legal factors
as a proxy for those factors’ importance. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Groscup, Steven D. Penrod,
Christina A. Studebaker & Matthew T. Huss, The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of
Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 339, 343 (2002).
118. The significance of this caveat depends on the degree to which one believes, as Richard
Posner has put it, that “there is no recognized duty of candor in judicial opinion writing” and that
judges write opinions that do not track their actual decisional process. Richard Posner, Some
Realism About Judges: A Reply to Edwards and Livermore, 59 DUKE L.J. 1177, 1182 (2010); see
also CASS SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 93 (1996) (“Judges may
write as if they are analogizers, but the analogies are often boilerplate disguising a political
judgment, rather than a helpful guide to judicial reasoning.”). Our study does not give us any
definitive insight on this question. But since the text of judicial opinions, not judges’ secret
motivations, are what are generally thought to constitute precedent, we think that the project has
significant value even if the Posnerian objection is entirely correct.
119. Drafting, testing, and revising the survey took about three months.
120. Two questions were added to the survey that required coders to revert and supply
answers to opinions previously coded. Those questions were (1) “Is the individual plaintiff
proceeding pro se?” and (2) “Did the court reject the Second Amendment claim on the grounds
that the Second Amendment did not apply to state or local regulations?”
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readers.121 Most of our choices were straightforward, but some merit
explanation.
At the outset, we needed to define what counts as a “Second
Amendment holding” and, by extension, which cases should be tagged
as false positives. The Second Amendment arises in various legal
contexts, some of which are insufficiently direct to shed much light on
Second Amendment doctrine. In particular, we excluded two broad
categories of opinions touching on the Second Amendment: opinions
that are not decisional and opinions that only incidentally rely on
Second Amendment law.
By nondecisional opinions, we mean those that are not controlling.
For example, we asked about the existence of dissenting and
concurring opinions because they can serve as a proxy for contentious
Second Amendment issues, but we excluded content analysis of those
opinions because they are not controlling.122 Similarly, our dataset does
not include dissents from denials of certiorari123 or of rehearing in the
lower courts,124 nor does it include reports and recommendations by
magistrate judges unless they were subsequently endorsed by the
district court.125 We also omit opinions that were vacated by the same
judge or judges who issued a prior opinion, as opposed to being vacated
on appeal or on rehearing en banc.126 In such cases, only the
subsequent, controlling opinion filed by the judge or panel is counted.
Of course, if our goal were an attitudinalist assessment, the content of
these opinions would be important. But they are less relevant to an
analysis of actual case outcomes and prevailing doctrine.
Likewise, we decided not to include cases in which the Second
121. See, e.g., Samaha & Germano, supra note 58, at 847–60.
122. We collected data on these opinions, and may use that data for a future article, but it is
not part of our analysis here.
123. The Supreme Court denied cert to more than sixty petitions in Second Amendment cases
during the study period, and Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, filed dissents from the
denial of certiorari in two of those cases. See generally Friedman v. City of Highland Park, Ill., 136
S. Ct. 447 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Jackson v. City of San Francisco, 135 S. Ct. 2799 (2015)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
124. See, e.g., Moore v. Madigan, 708 F.3d 901, 902–05 (7th Cir. 2013) (Hamilton, J.,
dissenting).
125. This choice was intended to avoid duplication at the district court level. In particular, it
controls for cases in which both the magistrate judge and district judge publish an opinion with
Second Amendment analysis about the same issue. Compare Dority v. Roy, No. 5:08cv127, 2010
WL 3257788 (E.D. Tex. 2010) (district court), with Dority v. Roy, No. 5:08cv127, 2010 WL
3257793 (E.D. Tex. 2010) (magistrate).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Chester, 367 F. App’x. 392, 399 (4th Cir. 2010), vacated on reh’g,
United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010).
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Amendment analysis was merely incidental to other legal issues. Such
opinions surely reflect Heller’s impact on the law generally, but their
Second Amendment discussion was often too tentative to count as a
Second Amendment holding. Five examples warrant mention. First,
some opinions include a discussion of the Second Amendment in the
course of applying the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to avoid
ruling on the Second Amendment claim.127 Second, other opinions only
briefly discuss the Second Amendment claim in order to determine
justiciability, such as whether a plaintiff has standing to challenge a gun
law.128 Third, opinions deciding whether to grant qualified immunity to
police officers who have seized a weapon depend in part on whether
aspects of the Second Amendment right are well established.129 Fourth,
a similar analysis occurs when a court decides if counsel was ineffective
for failing to make a Second Amendment argument.130 Finally, when
an offense is deemed unconstitutional on Second Amendment
grounds, subsequent opinions may ask whether a conviction for that
offense can still serve as a predicate for another offense—discussing, in
the process, the earlier constitutional ruling. This posture was
particularly common in Illinois after a major part of the state’s public
carry regime was struck down.131
These rules eliminated some, but not all, of the challenges that
arose for coders deciding when to count an opinion for the purposes of
our survey. Judicial opinions decide Second Amendment questions
127. United States v. Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2012), is exemplary. In Rehlander, the
First Circuit considered whether Maine’s emergency psychiatric admission law triggered 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2012), the ban on firearm possession by a person “committed to a mental
institution.” Id. at 46. Before Heller, the outcome would have been easy: the First Circuit had
already held that such admissions triggered § 922(g)(4). But in Rehlander, the court reconsidered
that conclusion since it now would result in the deprivation of a constitutional right. Rehlander,
666 F.3d at 48–49. Widespread invocation of constitutional avoidance could conceivably suggest
that courts perceive—even if they are not directly holding—that the Second Amendment right is
robust. We do not undertake the analysis necessary to show such a conclusion here.
128. See, e.g., Dearth v. Holder, 641 F.3d 499, 501–02 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
129. See, e.g., Baker v. Smiscik, 49 F. Supp. 3d 489, 500–01 (E.D. Mich. 2014).
130. See, e.g., Carter v. United States, No. 12–0344–CV–W–ODS, 2012 WL 3230032 (W.D.
Mo. 2012).
131. For a short time, Illinois courts refused to affirm convictions for being an Armed
Habitual Criminal where a predicate offense was violation of Illinois’s public carry law, which had
been struck down in People v. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d 321, 328 (Ill. 2013). See, e.g., People v. Lester,
No. 1–12–1882, 2014 IL App. (1st) 121882-U (2014). Ultimately, the decisions in Lester and others
like it were reversed in light of the Illinois Supreme Court decision in People v. McFadden, 61
N.E.3d 74, 82 (Ill. 2016), that a constitutionally infirm prior felony conviction could be used by
the government as a predicate felony in a subsequent case. See People v. Lester, No. 1–12–1882
2017 IL App. (1st) 121882-UB (2017).
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with varying degrees of definiteness, making it difficult to craft a set of
rules that would encompass every scenario. Consider the Fourth
Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Guerrero-Leco.132 Daniel
Guerrero-Leco argued that a federal statute prohibiting firearm
possession by certain undocumented immigrants violated his Second
Amendment rights.133 After his appeal was filed, the Fourth Circuit
decided United States v. Chester, adopting the two-part test for
evaluating Second Amendment claims.134 Rather than ruling on the
merits of Guerrero-Leco’s Second Amendment claim, the Fourth
Circuit vacated and remanded in a per curiam opinion instructing the
district court to apply Chester’s two-part analysis.135
Should the per curiam opinion in Guerrero-Leco be counted as a
Second Amendment opinion? Reasonable minds could argue both
sides. For the purposes of our analysis, we decided to include GuerreroLeco and others like it, because the Second Amendment is outcome
determinative, even though that outcome is just vacature and remand.
Another challenge in defining “Second Amendment holding” was
how to define whether a Second Amendment claim “succeeds” or
“fails.” Lee Epstein and Gary King note that there are at least ten
possible dispositions of cases decided by appellate courts, which
complicates even this seemingly straightforward task.136 We considered
counting only final judgments as Second Amendment successes or
failures, relegating the broad range of interlocutory outcomes to some
intermediate status. Ultimately, however, we decided on a scheme we
thought simpler and less error prone. For each opinion, we asked
whether the court rejected the Second Amendment claim. We count as
a “success” anything short of rejection. Because we are focused on
individual challenges within the context of particular cases, this seems
like the simplest and most straightforward approach: the party that
raised the Second Amendment claim prevailed at that stage.
This choice results in a larger number of “successes” than if we
only counted final rulings, but we think this makes sense. Interlocutory
rulings, such as the one in Guerrero-Leco, are relevant evidence of
whether appellate courts are reflexively rejecting Second Amendment
challenges. Moreover, such judgments can have a powerful effect on

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

United States v. Guerrero-Leco, 446 F. App’x. 610 (4th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 610; 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) (2012).
Guerrero-Leco, 446 F. App’x. at 610.
Id. at 611.
Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 85 tbl.5 (2002).

BLOCHER AND RUBEN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2018]

FROM THEORY TO DOCTRINE

4/12/2018 8:26 PM

1463

litigation incentives that likewise reflect the potency of the Second
Amendment right and sometimes lead to ultimate success for a
challenger—for example, a government motion to dismiss an
indictment, which would not otherwise be captured in a case coding
project.137
But this choice meant that our dataset includes opinions where the
Second Amendment claim prevailed in a given opinion, but did not
ultimately succeed at the conclusion of the litigation. After the remand
in Guerrero-Leco, for example, the Fourth Circuit applied the two-part
test in a similar case and declared the law at issue in Guerrero-Leco
constitutional.138 In light of that precedent, on remand the district court
reimposed Guerrero-Leco’s conviction and sentence.139 Thus, despite
prevailing at one stage of litigation, Guerrero-Leco’s Second
Amendment claim ultimately failed. A similar situation sometimes
arose when courts rejected the government’s motion to dismiss a
Second Amendment claim, only to later grant the government’s
motion for summary judgment.140
One final definitional note concerns categorizing the numerous
different types of weapon laws. Soon after Heller, Eugene Volokh
created a helpful and influential categorization scheme.141 We began
with that scheme and expanded it to generate the taxonomy in
Appendix B. 142 Some regulations reasonably could fit into more than
one category. For example, a ban on handgun ownership for anyone
under twenty-one years of age might be accomplished through a
registration scheme and thus reasonably could be classified as either a

137. See, e.g., United States v. Glisson, 460 F. App’x. 259, 263 (4th Cir. 2012) (remanding
challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012) for application of two-part test); Motion to Dismiss
Count Five of Indictment at 1, United States v. Glisson, No. 08-cr-405 (D.S.C. Feb. 27, 2012)
(government motion to dismiss conviction for violating § 922(g)(9) in “interest of judicial
economy or the interests of justice”); United States v. Glisson, No. 08-cr-405 (D.S.C. Feb. 28,
2012) (order granting government’s motion to dismiss conviction for violating § 922(g)(9)).
138. See United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 982 (4th Cir. 2012).
139. See United States v. Guerrero-Leco, No. 08-CR-00118 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 9, 2014) (order
entering judgment and sentence).
140. Compare Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 678 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1061 (S.D. Cal. 2010)
(denying government’s motion to dismiss claim that permitting scheme violated Second
Amendment), with Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1121 (S.D. Cal. 2010)
(granting government’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing claim that permitting
scheme violated Second Amendment).
141. See Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right To Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense:
An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1475–1545 (2009).
142. See Appendix B, https://dlj.law.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/04/Rubenand-Blocher-AppB.pdf, [https://perma.cc/Q2SP-U9WN].
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“who” ban or a “registration to possess” requirement. In such
situations, we chose one category (in this case, “Who” ban/”Minors”)
and made a note in the Appendix.
D. Coding and Reliability Review
Once the survey was complete and we defined key variables, we
carefully trained law student coders at Duke Law School and New
York University School of Law.143 The decision to rely on student
coders rather than personally coding each opinion in the first instance
was not an easy one. Legal scholars have had differing experiences with
student coders and sometimes opt to code datasets themselves.144
Author coding, however, tends to involve datasets much smaller than
ours,145 and it raises its own problems.146 Furthermore, there is good
reason to believe that law students are capable of accurately coding a
wide range of variables.147
Ultimately, we adopted an approach that we believe limits the
impact of coding errors. Initially, the coders reviewed and coded the
entire database. When they finished, we conducted a reliability
review148 and, with the exceptions described below,149 threw out some
survey questions and report qualified results on others.
Our reliability review proceeded in two steps. We first asked two
students to code the same group of Second Amendment opinions
without informing them that their work was duplicative. We then
143. Before beginning, each coder read the two most important Supreme Court decisions on
the Second Amendment, Heller and McDonald. Next, we conducted an orientation with each
coder, during which we provided an overview of Second Amendment law, explained the survey,
and fielded questions. During the coding process, we checked in frequently, and responded to
questions as they arose. The coding process lasted twelve months.
144. Hall & Wright, supra note 17, at 110–11.
145. Hall and Wright describe as follows:
85% of case-coding projects [including author- and student-coded projects] used
universal sampling limited only by year. Of these 114 universal samples, only 11 coded
more than 1000 cases, and 21 coded from 500 to 1000. Twenty-six of these projects
coded fewer than 100 cases (with 13 of these fewer than 51), and 39 coded between 100
and 300.
Id. at 102.
146. See id. at 111 (“From a social science perspective, [researchers coding their own datasets]
is the height of unmitigated subjectivism—the opposite of good scholarship.”).
147. Charles A. Johnson, Content-Analytic Techniques and Judicial Research, 15 AM. POL. Q.
169, 182–96 (1987).
148. According to Hall and Wright, fewer than fifteen percent of systematic reviews include
statistical testing for intercoder reliability, but we agree that “[g]ood technique” requires
reliability testing “in some fashion.” See Hall & Wright, supra note 17, at 113.
149. See infra notes 160–61 and accompanying text.
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compared their answers using two statistical measures: percent
agreement and Cohen’s kappa.150 Neither of these measures is perfect.
Percent agreement is the most common measure, but does not account
for chance agreement.151 Kappa adjusts for chance agreement, but does
so by making assumptions that can themselves be questioned, like
assuming that coders know, ex ante, the distribution of particular
answers (which is impossible in a novel study such as ours).152 Unless
noted, the student-coded data we use received a kappa score of 0.601.00, reflecting substantial to near-perfect agreement.153
Our second step was to compare the list of opinions in which the
coders indicated that the Second Amendment claim succeeded with the
similar list underlying Samaha and Germano’s study, which is
maintained by the Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence.154 The
comparison reflected substantial overlap, as expected, but also
omissions on both lists that reflect different methodological choices.
The Law Center dataset, for example, was built by searching Lexis
Nexis for opinions citing Heller, whereas our search was built by
searching Westlaw for opinions referencing “Second Amendment”
plus one other relevant term (one such term being “District of
Columbia v. Heller”).155 Our search therefore missed opinions that did
not mention “Second Amendment,”156 and the Law Center list missed

150. See Mary L. McHugh, Interrater Reliability: The Kappa Statistic, 22 BIOCHEMIA MEDICA
276, 282 (2012) (suggesting that researchers “calculate both percent agreement and kappa” in the
context of healthcare research projects). We are greatly indebted to Guangya Liu for assisting
with the statistical analysis necessary for the completion of this project, including determining
how to judge intercoder reliability.
151. Hall & Wright, supra note 17, at 113.
152. See McHugh, supra note 150, at 281–82 (concluding that assumptions underlying kappa
“may lower the estimate of agreement excessively”).
153. Id.; Hall & Wright, supra note 17, at 115–16. Cohen’s kappa figures “can range from -1
to +1, where 0 represents the amount of agreement that can be expected from random chance,
and 1 represents perfect agreement between the raters.” McHugh, supra note 150, at 279.
Researchers, including the creator of the measure, Jacob Cohen, have interpreted kappa values
between 0.21-0.40 as “fair” agreement, 0.41-0.60 as “moderate” agreement, 0.61-0.80 as
“substantial” agreement, and 0.81-1.00 as “almost perfect” agreement. Id.
154. The Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence tracks every opinion on Lexis Nexis that cites
Heller and codes for the outcome of the Second Amendment claim. The Law Center’s list also
contains other opinions that Law Center staff come across in the course of their work. The
spreadsheet is not publicly available, but a 2015 version is on file with the authors.
155. See supra text accompanying note 110.
156. Two such opinions are Welsch v. Twp. of Upper Darby, No. 07-4578, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 65500 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2008) and In re Weapons of A.S., No. A-3192-10T4, 2012 N.J.
Super. Unpub. LEXIS 256 (App. Div. Feb. 6, 2012).
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opinions that did not cite Heller.157 Moreover, the Law Center dataset
picks up opinions that did not include a Second Amendment holding
under our definition.158 As a result of our comparison, seven opinions
were recoded to indicate that a Second Amendment challenge
prevailed. For the most part, these seven opinions reflected the
definitional challenge of defining success: six of the seven contained
either a split decision or an otherwise ambiguous Second Amendment
victory.159
At the end of this process, we knew which questions returned
more or less consistent results and qualified our conclusions
accordingly.160 In two places we decided to code responses ourselves.
First, intercoder agreement naturally drops as the quantity of possible
answers increases,161 and the large number of subcategories in our
initial taxonomy (fifty-eight) exceeded whatever number could lead to
consistent student coding. Moreover, laws often do not fit neatly into a
single category, which further undermines consistency. For example,
weapons bans are often implemented through registration laws and
were thus classified by the student coders inconsistently, yet correctly,
as either a “weapon ban” or “registration law.” These questions called
for a different approach. Accordingly, we refined our categorization
scheme, attached here as Appendix B, and author-coded according to

157. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Leverone, No. 14-P-400, 2015 WL 3539763 (Mass. App. Ct.
June 5, 2015).
158. See supra notes 127–31 and accompanying text.
159. Those six opinions were: Baker v. Holder, No. 11-55067, 2012 WL 3044165, at *1–2 (9th
Cir. July 25, 2012) (affirming dismissal on standing grounds, but reversing dismissal on FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(b)(6) grounds and remanding with leave to amend complaint); Rhein v. Pryor, No. 13C-843, 2014 WL 1099157, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2014) (granting motion to dismiss official
capacity claim, but rejecting motion to dismiss individual capacity claim); Plouffe v. Town of
Dighton, 984 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4–5 (D. Mass. 2013) (denying motion to dismiss challenge to
discretionary denial of gun permit in one-sentence order, but after longer discussion of various
claims that “could not creditably” succeed); Fisher v. Kealoha, 869 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1209–25 (D.
Haw. 2012) (dismissing claims against city, unnamed individual defendants, and named individual
defendant, but denying motion to dismiss claim against individual defendant for injunctive relief);
People v. Bell, 2014 IL App (1st) 120314-U, at *4–5 (Ill. App. Ct. June 11, 2014) (affirming denial
of motion to dismiss for one count, but reversing for two others in light of People v. Aguilar);
People v. Campbell, 2 N.E.3d 1249, 1250–53 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (reversing one conviction on
Second Amendment grounds, but remanding to enter a judgment of conviction and sentence for
a separate, constitutional part of the statutory scheme). One case presented a clearer Second
Amendment success. See Wilson v. Cty. of Cook, 968 N.E.2d 641, 654–58 (Ill. 2012) (remanding
challenge to assault weapon ban for further factfinding).
160. See infra Part III.B (noting tentativeness of conclusions based on coding of doctrinal
questions, for which intercoder reliability measures were lower).
161. Hall & Wright, supra note 17, at 113.
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that scheme.
Second, we wanted to analyze the entire range of questions with a
particularly high degree of reliability for those cases in which the
Second Amendment claim succeeded. Thus, instead of making
tentative conclusions for this group of opinions, we recoded them
ourselves. For clarity, we separate the analysis of these author-coded
opinions in Part IV.
Even with these precautions and checks, our results inevitably
include some errors. This is unavoidable for a large-scale project such
as ours. Given the number of challenges we coded and the number of
questions asked about each one, the dataset involved roughly 100,000
data entry points, any one of which could be subject to a typo or other
error. That same size, however, provides some assurance that such
errors—so long as they are not systematic—will not dramatically
impact the conclusions.
E. Caveats and Lessons
All systematic reviews have their limitations and advantages, and
ours is no exception.162 The subject, scope, and nature of our study
raises a few particular caveats and lessons worth emphasizing.
Ambiguities and judgment calls are unavoidable. Our project
confirms that coding cases inevitably involves difficult and contestable
judgment calls.163 Many prior debates about the difficulty of coding
cases have focused on the appropriateness or accuracy of calling
particular outcomes “liberal” or “conservative,” or on how to classify
case results.164 We do not attempt the former, but faced plenty of
challenges with regard to the latter.
As noted above, it was difficult at times to determine whether a
case even had a Second Amendment holding165 or whether the Second

162. Edwards & Livermore, supra note 20, at 1966 (“In order for empirical scholarship to
serve its highest function, it is of the utmost importance that scholars in this field acknowledge
the limits of their research and maintain an appropriate level of modesty in their claims.”).
163. Hall & Wright state as follows:
It is inevitable that some measure of ambiguity will remain in how coding categories
should apply to particular cases. Often, there is no obvious right way to resolve these
judgment calls but such ambiguity is not disabling as long as coders are reasonably
consistent in how they apply coding categories across a range of cases.
Hall & Wright, supra note 17, at 109.
164. See, e.g., Andreas Broscheid, Comparing Circuits: Are Some U.S. Courts of Appeals More
Liberal or Conservative Than Others?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 171, 175 (2011).
165. See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.
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Amendment claim prevailed.166 Consistently placing gun laws into one
of fifty-eight oft-overlapping subcategories was also understandably
challenging, and called for an approach other than student coding.167
Similar challenges arose for many of the other issues that we attempted
to code.
These are unavoidable challenges for empirical projects168 and we
do not think that ours faces them in any unique way. There are,
moreover, standard responses. One is to reiterate the disclaimer that
our study—like all empirical studies—does not eliminate discretion,
disagreement, and outright error.169 We have attempted to minimize
these issues to the degree possible by carefully defining key variables
and conducting a reliability review that helps confirm both the
accuracy and consistency of our results.
Treating all cases equally does not account for the significance of
appellate precedent. Coding a large number of cases from various tiers
of the court system cannot fully capture the potentially relevant and
important differences among them. Circuit opinions bind trial courts
within the circuit and therefore generally have greater impact. Even
within court systems, some decisions have more weight than others.170
Because systematic analyses treat every opinion as an equal unit of
measurement, they cannot perfectly capture the hierarchical nature of
American jurisprudence. Of course, we can and do analyze district and
appellate opinions separately as well as together. Some of our
questions are also intended to be rough approximations of the
authoritativeness of an opinion,171 but they are only approximations.

166. See supra notes 136–40 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Epstein & King, supra note 136, at 74–76 (discussing conceptual difficulties in
empirical projects and the importance of “develop[ing] working definitions that minimize loss
from concept to definition”).
169. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: A Statistical Study
3 (Univ. of Chi. L. & Econ., Olin Working Paper No. 404, 2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1126403 [https://perma.cc/FUD6-U2RZ] (finding “a high error
rate” in parts of the Songer court of appeals database commonly used by empirical legal scholars);
Reed C. Lawlor, Fact Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 8 JURIMETRICS J. 107, 124 (1968)
(noting a mix of simple errors, inherent ambiguities and other issues leading to coding
disagreement, and the near-impossibility of eliminating all such disagreement).
170. See Thomas A. Smith, The Web of Law, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 309, 325 (2007) (“[T]he
concentration of legal authority (at least as measured by citation frequency) [is] in only a relative
few cases . . . .”).
171. For example, we ask whether a court concluded that the case was governed by existing
precedent. Moreover, we ask whether a Second Amendment discussion is three paragraphs or
less, which is a rough approximation for whether an opinion contains the rigorous analysis one
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Precedent is hard to measure or even to define. Unlike most prior
empirical work, we have attempted to code not just case outcomes but
case content—and, in particular, to investigate the impact of Heller.
Doing so yields valuable information about the state of Second
Amendment law and many of the legal factors that seem to be driving
it, while facing the same practical challenges as any other empirical
effort to measure precedent.172 But it also helps illustrate and
potentially sharpen questions about the nature of precedent and legal
reasoning.173
The simple view of precedent is that it refers to situations in which
a case is governed by a prior case or rule, in the sense that its result is
compelled by the result in a prior case regardless of the
decisionmaker’s agreement with the prior case.174 But that depends on
a question of causation that is just as fundamentally open textured (and
perhaps even normative) as those that arise in other areas of law. Our
dataset included a wide range of illustrative examples. It is clear that
Guerrero-Leco would not have been decided the way it was had it not
been for Heller. And yet it is still debatable whether it is a Second
Amendment case.175
Such jurisprudential questions do not have to be answered in
order to perform empirical analysis. One can measure the influence of
precedent by asking about express reliance on it or by using proxies for

would expect from an influential opinion. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
172. FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 202 (2007)
(“The close study of precedents and their impact [on appellate decisionmaking] is impossible with
currently available or readily foreseeable empirical tools.”). Some notable attempts have
nonetheless been made. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent:
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976) (studying age of typical citations
to precedents from the Supreme Court and lower courts).
173. Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain Novel
Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1157 (2005) (“Perhaps the most
important, yet understudied, area of legal research involves precedent.”); Adam M. Samaha,
Looking Forward Over a Crowd—Do More Interpretive Sources Mean More Discretion?, 92
N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 593–99 (2017) (discussing “competing predictions about the effects of
precedent accumulation on judicial discretion” and challenging earlier findings that as precedent
mounts, judicial discretion increases).
174. Fredrick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 575–76 (1987); see also Larry
Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 59 (1989) (“[I]f incorrectness were a
sufficient condition for overruling, there would be no precedential constraint in statutory and
constitutional cases.”); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional
Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 73 (1991) (supporting “the traditional
view that precedents should be overruled only when the prior decision was wrongly decided and
there is some other important disadvantage in respecting that precedent”) (emphasis in original).
175. See supra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.

BLOCHER AND RUBEN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1470

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/12/2018 8:26 PM

[Vol. 67:1433

it, both of which are strategies that we have utilized here. But these
measurements likely over- or understate a precedent’s influence—the
former because express reliance may not mean much, and the latter
because once a leading case becomes “domesticated” by circuit
precedent (as is increasingly true of Heller), analysis could become
more concise even though the influence is just as strong.
Judicial language might not reflect judicial reasoning. Another
limitation is inherent in our objective of identifying trends by
quantifying repetitive aspects of judicial reasoning. In particular, what
judges say they are doing in their opinions might not always be an
accurate indicator of what they are “really” doing.176 Express reasoning
may simply be a judge’s effort to justify his or her desired end.
This caveat, however, is not unique to systematic content analysis.
All doctrinal analysis relies heavily on express judicial reasoning. The
alternative would be to take the attitudinalist approach and focus on
judges’ perceived politics. But that approach faces challenges of its
own,177 and in any event should probably begin with an analysis of what
judges actually say they are doing. Moreover, we also find comfort in
Samaha and Germano’s conclusion that judicial ideology plays a
relatively small role, if any at all, in Second Amendment cases.178
The importance of procedural posture significantly complicates the
analysis. Litigants face differing burdens depending on the posture of
a case. For example, a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction against
a gun regulation would have to show that “he is likely to succeed on
the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that
an injunction is in the public interest.”179 A criminal defendant raising
a Second Amendment defense would simply have to convince a court
of his claim.
We have not coded for these burdens systematically. But we have
176. Sanford Levinson, Why Didn’t the Supreme Court Take My Advice in the Heller Case?
Some Speculative Responses to an Egocentric Question, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1491, 1497 (2009) (“For
many, especially political scientists, the best explanation for the kind of differences observed in
Heller (and, of course, many other cases) is that legal arguments per se are relatively weak
explanations for judicial votes.”); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 118, at 191–96 (summarizing
range of considerations and pressures that can underlie judicial reasoning); Posner, supra note
118, at 1182 (arguing that judicial opinions may be written in a legalistic style because that is most
familiar to law clerks or may be politically useful, but that judicial decisionmaking itself is far less
constrained by precedent or legalistic thinking).
177. See supra note 100.
178. See Samaha & Germano, supra note 58, at 861.
179. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
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no reason to think that such burdens would look any different in
Second Amendment cases than in other sets of cases. And we did code
for the procedural postures of the cases, which allows us to compare
success rates on different types of motions.
Out-of-court resolutions are not considered. Finally, our dataset is
comprised of judicial opinions, and therefore does not directly account
for the effect of out-of-court resolutions. If a municipality adjusts a gun
policy after an adverse ruling in trial court, for example, then there will
be no appellate litigation on point.180 This would distort comparisons
between trial and appellate court successes.181
Likewise, if a municipality preemptively rescinds or decides not to
adopt a policy based on Second Amendment concerns, or if civil
litigants settle Second Amendment claims out of court, or if criminal
defendants receive favorable plea agreements on the basis of a Second
Amendment claim, those outcomes are not counted in our dataset.182
How Heller has affected decisionmaking outside of the courtroom is
more difficult to measure, and we do not attempt to do so
systematically in this study.
III. THE STATE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT: EMPIRICAL
FINDINGS
This Part summarizes our empirical findings. First, we report
characteristics of Second Amendment challenges subject to litigation
and evaluate how those characteristics correlate with success. Second,
we quantify doctrinal trends that are guiding the lower courts in Second
Amendment cases.

180. See, e.g., Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (noting that,
after district court struck down the District of Columbia’s public carry ban in Palmer v. District of
Columbia, 59 F. Supp. 3d 173 (D.D.C. 2014), the D.C. Council opted to amend its code rather
than appeal the adverse decision); Veasey v. Wilkins, No. 5:14-CV-369-BO, 2015 WL 7776557, at
*1 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 2, 2015) (noting that after district court granted preliminary injunction against
North Carolina’s requirement that a person demonstrate American citizenship prior to obtaining
a concealed carry permit in Veasey v. Wilkins, No. 5:14–CV–369–BO, 2015 WL 1884832 (E.D.N.C.
Apr. 24, 2015), North Carolina removed the requirement).
181. On the other hand, this circumstance reflects an argument in favor of including district
court opinions in the dataset. If we limited ourselves to appellate courts, such litigation victories
would not be captured at all. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
182. See, e.g., Brief for the Villages of Winnetka and Skokie, Illinois, the City of Evanston,
Illinois, the Illinois Municipal League, & the International Municipal Lawyers Ass’n as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 15, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No.
08-1521) (“Winnetka and Evanston[, Illinois] repealed longstanding handgun laws to avoid costly
litigation brought by respondent NRA and others.”).
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Our primary goal is to give a descriptive account of the doctrine,
and not to test particular hypotheses, let alone make normative
assessments of the results or the law. We present our results in the form
of contingency tables (also known as cross-tabulations or crosstabs), a
common means of displaying frequency counts.
We think that this straightforward approach is the best way to
present the kind of generalized, foundational information we hope to
provide. Considering the lack of any large-scale quantitative study of
post-Heller Second Amendment doctrine, straightforward information
like the success rate of challenges in criminal cases—with the two
variables being success and criminal case—is a necessary starting point.
Simply knowing when two variables appear to intersect can help frame
questions about why or how they do so—the kinds of questions we
address in our regression analysis in Part IV.C—but, again, our primary
goal is simply to report the results.
A. Characterizing Second Amendment Challenges
Consistent with the common wisdom, the vast majority of Second
Amendment claims fail. Of the 1,153 Second Amendment challenges
in the database, only 108 were not rejected, for an overall success rate
of 9 percent.183 This subpart breaks down these figures.
1. Where Is the Second Amendment Action? We coded whether a
challenge was brought in federal appellate, federal trial, or state
appellate court. We also collected more granular data on specific
jurisdictions.
a. State or Federal, Trial or Appellate. Naturally, there is more
Second Amendment litigation in federal trial courts (491 challenges)
than in federal appellate courts (221 challenges). This reflects, in part,
logical attrition: not all litigants appeal adverse decisions. Notably,
however, our numbers suggest that the appeal rate is higher in Second
Amendment cases than in many other areas of law. Ted Eisenberg
found that, in general, 19 percent of nontried civil cases resulting in a
definitive judgment are appealed.184 Based on the raw numbers in our
183. This success rate is higher than recorded by the Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence,
which reports that ninety-six percent of claims fail. LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE,
supra note 63, at 6. Methodological differences could easily account for the variance. See supra
notes 154–58 and accompanying text. Throughout this discussion, we round percentiles to the
nearest whole number.
184. Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal Rates and Outcomes in Tried and Nontried Cases: Further
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dataset, it appears that as many as 28 percent of federal trial court civil
decisions involving the Second Amendment are appealed. The number
may even be higher, since some trial opinions had yet to result in an
appellate opinion when we conducted our search.185
The majority of Second Amendment litigation, however, has been
in the state courts. Our dataset includes 441 challenges decided by state
appellate courts, compared to 221 by federal appellate courts. This
disparity, though not surprising, is significant, since post-Heller
scholarship has focused almost exclusively on the federal courts.186 On
the whole, Second Amendment claims have succeeded most frequently
in federal appellate courts (13 percent), compared to federal trial
courts (8 percent) and state appellate courts (9 percent):
Table 1: Success Rates by Court System

Successful
Challenges
Total
Challenges

Federal
Trial
Court
38

Federal
Appellate
Court
29

State
Appellate
Court
41

8%

13%

9%

9%

491

221

441

1153

Total
108

Across all groups, p < 0.10; Federal Trial vs. Federal Appellate, p < 0.025.187

Exploration of Anti-Plaintiff Appellate Outcomes, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 659, 660 (2004).
185. Explaining these numbers is beyond the scope of the project, and would likely require a
different set of tools. Perhaps Second Amendment litigants are strongly motivated or certain of
the merits of their cases, and thus more willing than other litigants to pursue their claims on
appeal. Or perhaps actual or perceived uncertainty in the doctrine produces more appeals,
because arguments are not clearly understood to be weak. Because we do not have a comparable
dataset of state trial court decisions, we cannot conduct this analysis for state litigation.
186. See supra notes 44–61 and accompanying text.
187. We report probability values, or p-values, to reflect the statistical significance of our
results. P-values are calculated using statistical tests that differ depending on the inference being
drawn. For Tables 1–7, which test whether there is a relationship between categorical variables
and success (like court system and success), p-values are calculated using the chi-square statistic.
See DAVID KREMELBERG, PRACTICAL STATISTICS: A QUICK AND EASY GUIDE TO IBM SPSS
STATISTICS, STAT, AND OTHER STATISTICAL SOFTWARE 120, 124–29 (2010) (describing the chisquare statistic and how it is appropriate for categorical comparisons). For Tables 8–16, which
test changes over time (like success rates by year), p-values are calculated using Pearson’s
correlation coefficient, or Pearson’s r. See id. at 120–24 (describing Pearson’s correlation
coefficient and how it is appropriate for relationships over time). These statistics function by
testing the “null hypothesis” that two variables are independent and that chance alone resulted
in any correlation. See James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining Protections
and the Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 972 n.100 (1996) (describing p-values in the
context of the chi-square statistic). A commonly accepted threshold for statistical significance is
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The fact that Second Amendment appeals lose at a high rate is not
news to those who follow Second Amendment litigation. Until now,
though, no study has shown an above-average appeal rate in these
cases. The two trends are likely intertwined, perhaps due to uncertainty
in the doctrine (whether real or perceived), strongly motivated or
overconfident litigants, or some other reason hard to pin down with
our data.188 Whatever the reason, the high rate of appeal for failed
claims further inflates the overall failure rate. Below we add another
layer, discussing data pointing to the relative weakness of a large
proportion of Second Amendment claims.
b. Regional Variation. Second Amendment litigation is not
distributed evenly. In the federal courts of appeals, two courts account
for roughly one-third of 219 challenges189: the Fourth Circuit (thirty-six
challenges) and Ninth Circuit (thirty-one challenges).
Two potential explanations for this distribution are circuit sizes
and regional differences in gun control regimes. The Ninth Circuit is
the largest in the country, handling more appeals than any other
circuit.190 But that alone cannot explain the variance in Second
Amendment caseloads. The Fourth Circuit has a much smaller overall
caseload than the Ninth,191 but hears a similarly high number of Second
Amendment challenges. Another factor is the presence of gun-controlfriendly states within these circuits. California (Ninth Circuit) and

p < 0.05. Id. (collecting sources). We separate p-values into six ranges: p < 0.001, p < 0.01, p <
0.025, p < 0.05, p < 0.10, and p > 0.10. We do not include p-values for Tables 17–24, which simply
report the characteristics of successful challenges.
188. As noted above, supra notes 180–82 and accompanying text, our analysis does not take
into account settlements, and we make no claims about the impact of settlement rates across
different types of litigation.
189. Two federal appellate decisions are excluded from this regional analysis: McDonald v.
City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) and United States v. Cooper, No. ACM 38307, 2014 WL
4894599 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Sept. 24, 2014).
190. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl.B-7 (2016) (showing relative caseloads of
different circuits). Relative caseload can also explain why sixteen Second Amendment opinions
were published in the Fifth Circuit, despite the fact that every state in the Fifth Circuit received
an “F” rating by the Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence—an indication of lax gun laws. See id.
(6,359 cases commenced in Fifth Circuit in the twelve months ending March 31, 2015, reflecting
second largest docket among circuits); 2016 Gun Law State Scorecard, LAW CTR. PREVENT GUN
VIOLENCE, http://gunlawscorecard.org/ [https://perma.cc/9XX3-4R8G] (showing “F” rating for
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas).
191. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 190, at tbl.B-7 (7,134 cases commenced
in the Ninth Circuit and 3,769 commenced in the Fourth Circuit during the twelve months ending
March 31, 2015).
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Maryland (Fourth Circuit) are known to have some of the strongest
gun laws in the country, which in turn makes them target-rich
environments for Second Amendment claims. But again, this is only a
partial explanation. Far fewer Second Amendment challenges were
heard in the Second Circuit (eleven challenges), which has a case load
similar to the Fourth192 and is home to two states associated with strong
gun laws, New York and Connecticut. Differences exist between the
dockets and priorities of the various circuits in other areas of
substantive law, which may help explain their differing rates of Second
Amendment litigation.193
Second Amendment claims have had relatively high success rates
in the courts that have been criticized as giving the Second Amendment
right second-class treatment.194 Overall, claims have succeeded most
frequently—both in absolute terms and proportionally—in the Second,
Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits. Indeed, with the exception
of one case in the Sixth Circuit, these are the only circuits that have
upheld a Second Amendment challenge. As we note, these are the
circuits with the strongest gun laws and, thus, the best litigation targets.
Likely for that reason, they also have been a primary focus for impact
litigation efforts by sophisticated gun rights advocates.
Table 2: Success Rates by Federal Circuit
Circuit

Successes

Success
Rate

Total
Challenges

Circuit

Successes

Success
Rate

Total
Challenges

First

0

0%

7

Seventh

3

16%

19

Second

2

18%

11

Eighth

0

0%

23

Third

0

0%

12

Ninth

4

13%

31

Fourth

4

11%

36

Tenth

0

0%

15

Fifth

0

0%

15

Eleventh

0

0%

17

Sixth

1

9%

11

D.C.

14

64%

22

Total

28

13%

219

p < 0.001

192. Id. (3,676 cases commenced in the Second Circuit during the twelve months ending
March 31, 2015).
193. See Marin K. Levy, The Mechanics of Federal Appeals: Uniformity and Case Management
in the Circuit Courts, 61 DUKE L.J. 315, 366–75 (2011).
194. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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In state courts as well, the bulk of Second Amendment litigation
has occurred in geographic areas known to have stronger gun
regulations.195 Of 438 state appellate challenges in the database,196 66
percent are from Illinois (167), California (59), Massachusetts (36), and
New Jersey (26). Of these four states, only appellate courts in Illinois
have granted Second Amendment relief. Those litigation rates are
dramatically different than in states thought to be more gun friendly.
For example, appellate courts in the twenty-five states that have
received an “F” rating from the Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence
for their gun laws197 heard thirty-one Second Amendment challenges
and rejected all of them. We cannot show causation, but it is not hard
to imagine why states with less gun regulation would spawn fewer
complaints about gun laws and be less attractive to impact litigators.
(This despite the fact that voters who do not push legislatures to pass
stringent gun laws are also likely to elect gun-friendly judges). Second
Amendment litigants simply are not bringing cases in those states,
perhaps because they lack targets.
The large number of challenges and successes in Illinois can be
explained by a feature of Illinois’s former scheme for regulating public
carry. Before 2013, it was illegal for a person to carry a firearm
“uncased, loaded and immediately accessible.”198 In People v.
Aguilar199 and People v. Burns,200 the Illinois Supreme Court struck
down this scheme as violating the Second Amendment. As a result,
dozens of criminal convictions were challenged and vacated, producing
numerous opinions on Westlaw. The summary chart of successes by
state is below:

195. Our data alone cannot cast light on another significant issue: the degree to which, after
Heller, the Second Amendment has replaced state constitutional analogues as the basis for gun
rights challenges in state courts.
196. This number and the following analysis exclude three challenges from the Virgin Islands.
See Nicholas v. People of the Virgin Islands, 56 V.I. 718, 750–52 (2012) (one challenge); Virgin
Islands v. James, 54 V.I. 45, 47 (2010) (two challenges).
197. See 2016 Gun Law State Scorecard, supra note 190 (listing Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming as having an “F” score).
198. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24–1.6(a)(3)(A) (West 2008).
199. People v. Aguilar, 2 N.E.3d 321 (Ill. 2013), modified, People v. Burns, 79 N.E.3d 159 (Ill.
2015).
200. People v. Burns, 79 N.E.3d 159 (Ill. 2015).
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Table 3: Success Rates in State Appellate Cases
State

Successes

Success
Rate

Total
Challenges

State

Successes

Success
Rate

Total
Challenges

AL

0

0%

0

MT

0

0%

0

AK

0

0%

7

NE

0

0%

0

AZ

0

0%

3

MV

0

0%

1

AR

0

0%

0

NH

0

0%

0

CA

0

0%

59

NJ

0

0%

26

CO

0

0%

1

NM

0

0%

0

CT

2

40%

5

NY

0

0%

9

DE

0

0%

0

NC

1

33%

3

DC

5

14%

35

ND

0

0%

0

FL

0

0%

3

OH

2

13%

16

GA

0

0%

1

OK

0

0%

0

HI

0

0%

1

OR

0

0%

2

ID

0

0%

1

PA

0

0%

7

IL

28

17%

167

RI

0

0%

0

IN

0

0%

1

SC

0

0%

0

IA

0

0%

1

SD

0

0%

0

KS

0

0%

3

TN

0

0%

1

KY

0

0%

0

TX

0

0%

1

LA

0

0%

8

UT

0

0%

0

ME

0

0%

0

VT

0

0%

1

MD

0

0%

4

VA

0

0%

1

MA

0

0%

36

WA

0

0%

8

MI

2

18%

11

WV

0

0%

0

MN

0

0%

7

WI

1

17%

6

MS

0

0%

1

WY

0

0%

0

MO

0

0%

1

Total

41

9%

438

p > 0.10

2. Who Is Bringing Second Amendment Challenges? We collected
data on various characteristics of the litigants bringing Second

BLOCHER AND RUBEN IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1478

4/12/2018 8:26 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 67:1433

Amendment challenges. Here, we use that data to compare civil
plaintiffs and criminal defendants, pro se and represented plaintiffs,
and individual and organizational plaintiffs.
a. Criminal or Civil. Sixty-four percent of the challenges in the
database were initiated by criminal defendants, with significant
variations between court systems: 45 percent of federal trial challenges,
66 percent of federal appellate challenges, and 85 percent of state
appellate challenges. The defendants in these cases succeeded in just 6
percent of their challenges, though with meaningful distinctions
between federal trial court (0.5 percent), federal appellate court (4
percent), and state appellate court (10 percent). The latter figure is a
function of the Aguilar litigation in Illinois, as described above.201 If we
omit Illinois criminal cases, the state appellate court success rate drops
to 6 percent, more in line with the rate in federal appellate court.
Litigants fared considerably better in civil cases. About 36 percent
of the database involved civil claims, again with variance between court
systems: civil challenges accounted for 55 percent of federal trial
challenges, 34 percent of federal appellate challenges, and 15 percent
of state appellate challenges. Overall, civil litigants succeeded in 15
percent of challenges, though that rate jumped to 30 percent in federal
appellate court.
Table 4: Success Rates in Civil and Criminal Cases
Federal Trial
Court
Success
Successes
Rate
37/269

14%

Criminal

1/222

0%

Total

38/491

8%

Civil

p < 0.001

Federal Appellate
Court
Success
Successes
Rate
23/76

State Appellate
Court
Success
Successes
Rate

Total
Successes

Success
Rate

62/411

15%

30%

2/66

3%

6/145

4%

39/375

10%

46/742

6%

29/221

13%

41/441

9%

108/1153

9%

p < 0.001

p < 0.10

p < 0.001

b. Pro Se or Represented. Within the subset of civil cases, the
success rate varied considerably depending on whether a plaintiff was
represented by counsel (21 percent) or not (2 percent).202 The impact

201. See supra notes 198–200 and accompanying text.
202. This calculation excludes eight challenges in which it was not clear whether a plaintiff
was represented and one challenge involving only an organizational plaintiff for which the
representation question was not asked.
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of representation was most apparent at the federal appellate level,
where represented parties succeeded 40 percent of the time. Federal
appellate courts rejected all of the Second Amendment claims brought
by pro se litigants.
Our data cannot explain why pro se litigants are particularly
unsuccessful—for example, whether they are disadvantaged by a lack
of formal legal training or simply select weaker cases. Whatever the
reason, self-representation closely correlates with failure in Second
Amendment litigation.
Table 5: Success Rates by Representation in Civil Cases
Federal Trial
Court

Pro Se
Represented

Federal
Appellate Court

State Appellate
Court

Total

Successes

Success
Rate

Successes

Success
Rate

Successes

Success
Rate

Successes

Success
Rate

3/98

3%

0/17

0%

0/11

0%

3/126

2%

34/166

20%

23/58

40%

2/52

4%

59/276

21%

p < 0.001

p < 0.01

p > 0.10

p < 0.001

c. Individual or Organizational.
The existence of an
organizational plaintiff, meanwhile, correlated with more success at the
federal trial level, but not at the federal appellate level. In federal trial
court, cases brought by an organizational plaintiff were successful 29
percent of the time, compared to 9 percent for individual plaintiffs.203
This variance disappears on appeal, where individual and
organizational appellants had success rates of 31 percent and 28
percent, respectively.

203. Cf. Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil Litigation:
Differences Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in the Disposition of Federal Civil
Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1280–81 (2005) (reporting that cases involving organizational
plaintiffs are more likely than cases involving individual plaintiffs to be resolved through
settlements instead of through adjudication).
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Table 6: Success Rates for Organizational and Individual Plaintiffs
Federal Trial
Court

Federal Appellate
Court

State Appellate
Court

Total

Successes

Success
Rate

Successes

Success
Rate

Successes

Success
Rate

Successes

Success
Rate

Individual

19/205

9%

16/51

31%

2/65

3%

37/321

12%

Org. Only

0/1

0%

0/0

0%

0/0

0%

0/1

0%

Both

18/63

29%

7/25

28%

0/1

0%

25/89

28%

p < 0.001

p > 0.10

p > 0.10

p < 0.001

3. What Types of Laws Are Being Challenged?204 It will come as
no surprise that litigation and success rates vary depending on the type
of weapon regulation challenged. Both Heller and McDonald expressly
affirmed the constitutionality of certain restrictions—like firearm bans
for convicted felons205—which thus present relatively weak claims. But
the Supreme Court left open the constitutionality of dozens of others.
We sought to compare litigation and success rates across the full range
of challenged weapons regulations. Appendix C contains the results of
this effort for all subclassifications in our scheme. The next table
reports the results of just our highest-level categorizations.

204. As noted above, Appendix B provides our categorization scheme.
205. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27; McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561
U.S. 742, 786 (2010).
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Table 7: Success Rates by Category of Law Challenged

Category

Federal Trial
Court
Success
Successes
Rate

Federal Appellate
Court
Success
Successes
Rate

State Appellate
Court
Success
Successes
Rate

Total
Successes

Success
Rate

Who

13/218

6%

7/117

6%

2/162

1%

22/497

4%

What

4/47

9%

4/26

15%

6/31

19%

14/104

13%

Where

7/29

24%

1/12

8%

0/4

0%

8/45

18%

When

3/54

6%

0/26

0%

1/28

4%

4/108

4%

How

1/4

25%

0/1

0%

1/10

10%

2/15

13%

Bus.
Res.

3/28

11%

0/5

0%

0/1

0%

3/34

9%

Pub.
Car.

5/34

15%

3/9

33%

29/127

23%

37/170

22%

Gun
Reg.

2/35

6%

14/19

74%

2/60

3%

18/114

16%

Official

0/32

0%

0/5

0%

0/7

0%

0/44

0%

Misc.

0/10

0%

0/1

0%

0/11

0%

0/22

0%

p < 0.05

p < 0.001

p < 0.001

p < 0.001

By far, the most common type of challenge was to “who” bans, or
prohibitions on possession by certain classes of people. This category
accounted for 43 percent of all challenges in the dataset. Challenges
that fell into the “who” category were generally losers, with a success
rate of just 4 percent.206 This relatively low success rate was largely due
to 273 challenges to felon-in-possession statutes. These challenges,
which account for 24 percent of the entire dataset, were rejected 99
percent of time and enjoyed no success at the federal appellate level
during our study period.207
Three categories of challenges fared worse than challenges to
206. Unlike the dataset as a whole, federal appellate and trial courts were equally likely to
reject challenges in this category (6 percent success rates in both court systems). Meanwhile, both
were more receptive than state appellate courts, where litigants had success in only 1 percent of
challenges.
207. Of all subcategories, however, this one seems most likely to experience an upsurge in
successes going forward. After our study period concluded, the Third Circuit granted as-applied
relief to two plaintiffs challenging the federal felon-in-possession law, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2012). See Binderup v. Att’y Gen., 836 F.3d 336, 356–57 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied,
137 S. Ct. 2323 (2017). That opinion will likely incentivize more challenges and lead to more
successes. This likely effect of Binderup exemplifies an important limitation: the data presented
in Table 7 is not temporally weighted, meaning that challenges decided early and late in the study
period are counted the same. The discussion therefore does not purport to account for the impact
of controlling precedent established after the accumulation of contrary case law.
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“who” bans: challenges to “when” bans, official action, and twenty-two
challenges that defied easy categorization. “When” bans, or temporary
restrictions on the possession of weapons, accounted for 9 percent of
the dataset and had a success rate of just 4 percent. Challenges to
official action—including gun seizures during arrests, court rulings on
burdens in criminal cases, and employee policies—made up 4 percent
of the database and uniformly failed. Miscellaneous challenges, such as
those contesting a state’s gun control regime generally208 or a murder
conviction,209 accounted for 2 percent of the dataset and also had no
success.
Litigants targeting other types of restrictions succeeded at a higher
rate. Challenges to “what” restrictions, or those on weapon
categories,210 accounted for 9 percent of the dataset and had a 13
percent success rate, more than three times as high as “who” bans.
Within “what” restrictions, litigants did better in federal appellate
court (15 percent success) than federal trial court (9 percent success).
Litigants also fared better when they challenged regulations on
nonlethal weapons (25 percent success) than other types of weapons.211
This last observation is logical: the lethality of a regulated weapon and
the government’s concern for public safety—the usual rationale for
weapon regulation212—should rise and fall together.213
One controversial policy in the public debate has been less so in
court: bans on assault weapons. The database contains eighteen
challenges to assault weapon bans—ten in federal court and eight in

208. See, e.g., Mongielo v. Cuomo, 968 N.Y.S.2d 828, 829–30 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013).
209. See, e.g., Klinefelter v. Pennywell, No. EDCV 12–1847–R (OP), 2013 WL 5840309, at *20
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2013).
210. This category contains challenges to both outright bans and highly restrictive registration
schemes. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(o); 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5845(a)–(b) (2012) (banning possession
of machine guns unless lawfully possessed before enactment of the Firearm Owners Protection
Act of 1986; banning possession of such lawfully possessed machine guns subject to federal
registration and fees).
211. See Appendix C.
212. See Ruben, supra note 91, at 164 (“[Public safety] was the interest set forth by the
government in Heller and . . . has been the interest relied upon in almost all Second Amendment
cases thereafter.” (citations omitted)).
213. See generally Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, Lethality, Public Carry, and
Adequate Alternatives, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 279 (2016) (arguing that regulations of lethal
weapons are more constitutionally defensible where adequate nonlethal alternatives are
available); Eugene Volokh, Nonlethal Self-Defense, (Almost Entirely) Nonlethal Weapons, and
the Rights to Keep and Bear Arms and Defend Life, 62 STAN. L. REV. 199, 216 (2009) (concluding
that nonlethal weapons are covered by the Second Amendment and noting that they facilitate
crime “at a lower level of harm than lethal weapons such as guns and knives”).
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state appellate court. During the study period, courts rejected all but
two: Wilson v. County of Cook, in which the Illinois Supreme Court
remanded for further fact finding,214 and Cutonilli v. State,215 in which
the district court stayed proceedings pending the outcome in a similar
case, Kolbe v. Hogan. In Kolbe, the Fourth Circuit ultimately upheld
the ban.216
“Where” bans, or prohibitions on weapons possession, shooting
ranges, and gun stores in specified places, made up 4 percent of the
database. These challenges fared better than challenges to most other
categories of laws, with a success rate of 18 percent. Courts facing
challenges in this subset generally agreed that bans on possession in or
near schools are constitutional, consistent with Heller’s carve-out for
“sensitive places.”217 Some courts disagreed about what makes a space
“sensitive” beyond certain obvious categories, with two federal district
courts granting relief from restrictions they deemed too broad.218 One
of those decisions was reversed on appeal.219 In the wake of the other,
the federal government reconsidered a restriction on firearms on U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers property.220 Aside from successful challenges
to location-based bans on possession, several restrictions on gun stores
and shooting ranges within Chicago were struck down.221
214. See generally Wilson v. Cty. of Cook, 968 N.E.2d 641 (Ill. 2012). In July 2017, a revised
complaint was filed in this case. See Complaint, Wilson v. Cty. of Cook, No. 2017-CH-10345 (Ill.
Cir. Ct. Jul. 28, 2017).
215. Cutonilli v. State, No. JKB-15-629, 2015 WL 5719572 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2015).
216. See id. at *6; Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 135–41 (4th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
217. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
218. See Morris v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 60 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1125–26 (D. Idaho 2014)
(holding unconstitutional an “outright ban” on handguns on Army Corps of Engineers property);
Morris v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 990 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1088–89 (D. Idaho 2014) (enjoining
the Army Corps of Engineers from enforcing a ban on handguns possessed by law-abiding
individuals on Corps-owned public lands); Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 10-CV-02408-RPM,
2013 WL 3448130, at *5–7 (D. Colo. July 9, 2013) (holding that a ban on firearms within U.S. Post
Offices was constitutional, but banning firearms in the surrounding parking lot was not), rev’d,
790 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding both bans—in U.S. Post Office parking lots and
buildings—constitutional).
219. Bonidy, 790 F.3d at 1128–29, rev’g No. 10-CV-02408-RPM, 2013 WL 3448130 (D. Colo.
July 9, 2013).
220. See News Release, Mountain States Legal Found., Trump Administration Seeks
Resolution of Idaho Woman’s Army Corps Gun Ban Battle (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www
.mountainstateslegal.org/news-updates/news-releases/2017/03/03/trump-administration-seeksresolution-of-idaho-woman-s-army-corps-gun-ban-battle#.WYEDNITytpg
[https://perma.cc/23XY-FT67] (noting that federal lawyers filed a motion indicating the
government’s willingness to “reconsider[] the firearms policy” (alteration in original)).
221. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 771 (7th Cir. 2011) (overturning ban on firing
ranges); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 70 F. Supp. 3d 871, 884 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (overturning requirement
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“How” restrictions, those requiring safe storage of firearms, have
rarely been a litigation target—they account for just 1 percent of the
dataset. Overall, this category has a 13 percent success rate, with a
single victory at each of the federal trial and state appellate levels.222
This is one area, however, where success may prove short-lived. The
court in one of the two cases denied a motion to dismiss a complaint
challenging Illinois’s safe storage law, but noted that the plaintiffs “may
face an uphill battle on the merits of their claim” at later stages.223 The
claim then became moot and was dismissed after a plaintiff in the case
moved to another state.224 In the other case, the court remanded for the
trial court to apply heightened scrutiny to Ohio’s vehicle storage law.225
On remand and in a subsequent appeal, the law was upheld.226
Challenges to business restrictions and fees accounted for 3
percent of the dataset and had a 9 percent success rate. Courts rejected
the few Second Amendment challenges to background check
requirements and dealer license requirements. Two challenges to
restrictions on the sale or transfer of firearms227 and one challenge to
restrictions placed on shooting ranges228 succeeded in federal district
court.
Challenges to public carry restrictions had a success rate of 22
percent, which is the highest in our dataset. This category, which
included both public carry bans and public carry permitting schemes,
touches on the contentious issue of to what extent the government can
regulate weapons outside the home. Much of the success in this
litigation, however, was limited to bans on public carry, which were
ultimately struck down in Washington, D.C., and Illinois, both of the
that shooting ranges be located in manufacturing districts); Ill. Ass’n of Firearms Retailers v. City
of Chicago, 961 F. Supp. 2d 928, 931 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (overturning ban on gun stores).
222. See Second Amendment Arms, 135 F. Supp. 3d at 765 (denying motion to dismiss safestorage law); State v. Shover, No. 25944, 2012 WL 3595127, at *3–4 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2012)
(remanding vehicle safe-storage law for application of heightened scrutiny).
223. Second Amendment Arms, 135 F. Supp. 3d at 765.
224. See Notification of Docket Entry at 1, Second Amendment Arms v. City of Chicago, No.
10-cv-04257 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27, 2016).
225. Shover, 2012 WL 3595127, at *3–4.
226. See State v. Shover, 8 N.E.3d 358, 361–65 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014).
227. See Mance v. Holder, 74 F. Supp. 3d 795, 803–13 (N.D. Tex. 2015); Ill. Ass’n of Firearms
Retailers v. City of Chicago, 961 F. Supp. 2d 928, 936–47 (N.D. Ill. 2014). In January 2018, the
Fifth Circuit reversed the district court decision in Mance. See Mance v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 183
(5th Cir. 2018) (upholding federal law banning sale of firearms to out-of-state residents).
228. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 70 F. Supp. 3d 871, 881–92 (N.D. Ill. 2014). In January 2017,
the Seventh Circuit agreed with the district court that certain restrictions on shooting ranges in
Chicago violated the Second Amendment. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 846 F.3d 888, 898 (2017).
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places they existed. The success rate in those cases was 47 percent, with
fifty-seven of the sixty-two total challenges in this subcategory arising
out of Illinois. Just one federal appellate court has considered the
constitutionality of a public carry ban, striking down the Illinois law.229
The database includes eighty-nine challenges to licensing regimes
for public carry (either open or concealed), eight of which succeeded,
for an overall success rate of 9 percent. No court held that requiring
public carry licenses was per se unconstitutional, and challenges in
“shall-issue” jurisdictions230 uniformly failed. Five of the eight
successful challenges arose from the “may-issue” policies231 in
Maryland or California,232 policies which later were upheld by the
Fourth and Ninth Circuits.233 The other three successes were in the
D.C. District Court and Court of Appeals.234 One of the three District
of Columbia successes was a challenge to a may-issue policy similar to
Maryland’s and California’s.235 Unlike in those two places, however,
the D.C. Circuit recently agreed that the policy was unconstitutional,236
setting up a clear circuit split. The D.C. Circuit’s opinion came after the
conclusion of our study period, and so was not coded.
The final category of challenges involved laws calling for the
permitting of firearms or of people desiring to possess or purchase
them.237 These restrictions have also been controversial, resulting in
114 challenges and a 16 percent success rate. Much of that success
229. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935–42 (7th Cir. 2012).
230. See Blocher, supra note 81, at 219 (defining “shall issue” regimes as those that “compel
states to issue public carrying licenses to anyone who is not a felon, mentally ill, or otherwise
excluded from the scope of Second Amendment coverage”).
231. Id. at 218 (describing “may issue” regimes as those that require a showing of good cause
in order to obtain a public carry permit).
232. See Richards v. Prieto, 560 F. App’x 681, 682 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d on reh’g sub nom.,
Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016); Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d
1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d on reh’g en banc, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016); Birdt v. San
Bernardino Sheriff’s Dept., No. EDCV 13–0673–VAP (JEM), 2014 WL 2608127, at *8 (C.D. Cal.
June 9, 2014); Woollard v. Sheridan, 863 F. Supp. 2d 462, 464–65 (D. Md. 2012), rev’d, 712 F.3d
865 (4th Cir. 2013); Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 678 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1055–56 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
233. See Peruta, 824 F.3d at 942; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 882.
234. See Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1, 14 (D.D.C. 2015), rev’d, 864 F.3d
650 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Jackson v. United States, 76 A.3d 920, 943–48 (D.C. 2013); Plummer v.
United States, 983 A.2d 323, 334–42 (D.C. 2009).
235. See Wrenn, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 3–4.
236. See Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 668 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
237. Our study categorized three types of licenses/permits: for public carry, for particular
firearms, and for people desiring to possess firearms. The discussion in this paragraph refers to
the latter types of licensing—those involving firearms and people, rather than the manner of
bearing.
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corresponds to litigation involving the District of Columbia’s evolving
regulatory regime.238 Absent the litigation in the District of Columbia,
the success rate in this category drops to 3 percent.
B. Trends in the Evolving Second Amendment
The preceding section has given a snapshot of Second
Amendment outcomes over the past decade, across a variety of
different measures. In this section, we introduce a new metric—that of
time. Based on our data, Second Amendment challenges experienced
a steadily increasing success rate, from 0 percent in the challenges
brought after Heller in 2008 to 19 and 15 percent in 2014 and 2015,
respectively.
Table 8: Success Rate by Year
Opinion year

Successful
Challenges

Total
Challenges

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Total

0

4

7

12

14

13

36

22

0

108

0%

4%

5%

7%

9%

9%

19%

15%

0%

9%

70

114

143

178

161

144

193

145

5

1153

p < 0.001*
*Excluding 2016

Because we have coded not just case results but the content of
judicial opinions, we explore what is happening doctrinally as success
rates rise. Doing so, however, presents empirical problems, for at least
two reasons. First, the kinds of questions one must ask in order to code
methodology are almost inevitably more subjective than those
regarding the content of the law at issue. We have tried to minimize
this problem by translating subjective questions into objective ones.
For example, instead of asking “whether the court employed an
originalist methodology,” we asked coders whether the court cited
materials from various historical periods. By using such proxies we can

238. See Heller v. District of Columbia, 801 F.3d 264, 270 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Heller II, 670 F.3d
1244, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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at least gain some traction on larger and potentially more subjective
questions.
The second problem, which is related to the first, is that courts do
not always announce what they are doing. By this we do not mean that
the attitudinalists are necessarily right about ideology—a matter on
which, again, we are not attempting to weigh in—but simply that
doctrinal analysis may be sub silentio. A court might do a tiers-ofscrutiny analysis by analyzing the government interest and assessing
whether a law is tailored to meet it, without ever invoking words like
“compelling,” “narrowly,” “substantially,” and so on. Such a case
might then escape coding, particularly as the survey questions
themselves become more objective and precise in order to meet the
first objection about subjectivity.
Perhaps as a result of these two problems (although it is hard to
know for certain), our tests of intercoder reliability returned lower
scores for doctrinal questions than for the kinds of categorization
questions discussed in Part III.A. The following conclusions are
accordingly tentative.
In order to set the chronological stage, we can start with objective
numbers:
Table 9: Second Amendment Challenges by Opinion Year
Opinion year
2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Total

Federal Trial

57

51

81

54

57

41

82

64

4

491

Federal Appellate

8

30

25

44

35

24

26

29

0

221

State Appellate

5

33

37

80

69

79

85

52

1

441

Total

70

114

143

178

161

144

193

145

5

1153

p > 0.10*
*P-value calculated for final row: overall challenges per year; excluding 2008
and 2016

One might have expected an initial wave of cases addressing the
questions Heller left open and then a decrease over time as the law
became clear and litigants began to “price in” their likelihood of
success.239 That does not seem to have happened. Other than a bump

239. Cf. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–6 (1984) (explaining how litigants consider the likelihood of a judicial decision
in selecting disputes for litigation).
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in appeals cases a year after Heller—giving time for 2008 trials to
conclude and be appealed—and a bump in state cases in 2011—after
McDonald made the Second Amendment applicable to state and local
regulations—the numbers are relatively flat across time.
Our primary interest is in what is happening within those cases,
and whether methodology has changed over time. Perhaps the
broadest hypothesis is that, in the years since Heller, the Second
Amendment has increasingly become “normal,” in the sense that
Second Amendment cases are increasingly resolved by precedent and
standard legal tests rather than original historical research. If so, our
data should show increases in cases decided based on controlling
precedent, and corresponding decreases in matters of first impression
and direct citations to historical materials.
Our data provides only partial support for this hypothesis. Heller
remains the lodestar,240 in particular the paragraphs regarding
“presumptively lawful” regulations. Courts considering a majority of
the challenges in our study (60 percent) explicitly cited those
paragraphs, though the ratio trended downward over time, perhaps
reflecting the fact that Heller itself has now been baked into circuit
precedent.

240. This provides some support—consistent with other empirical studies—that vertical
precedent matters. See John Gruhl, The Supreme Court’s Impact on the Law of Libel: Compliance
by Lower Federal Courts, 33 W. POL. Q. 502, 517 (1980) (finding high rates of compliance with
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)); Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan,
Supreme Court Impact on Compliance and Outcomes: Miranda and New York Times in the United
States Court of Appeals, 43 W. POL. Q. 297, 313 (1990) (finding “nearly universal compliance”
with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
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Table 10: Citations to Heller Paragraphs on “Presumptively
Lawful”Regulations
Opinion year

Invoke
"Presumptively
Lawful"
Paragraphs
Do Not Invoke
"Presumptively
Lawful"
Paragraphs
Total
Challenges

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Total

56

75

95

109

104

94

90

66

2

691

80%

66%

66%

61%

65%

65%

47%

46%

40%

60%

14

39

48

69

57

50

103

79

3

462

20%

34%

34%

39%

35%

35%

53%

54%

60%

40%

70

114

143

178

161

144

193

145

5

1153

p < 0.010*
*Excluding 2016

Courts that invoke the “presumptively lawful” regulations
paragraphs are much more likely (71 percent versus 45 percent) to
devote more than three paragraphs to Second Amendment analysis,
suggesting perhaps that Heller’s exceptions are not being used as a
shortcut to avoid scrutiny. Moreover, the proportion of cases devoting
more than three paragraphs of analysis to the Second Amendment
challenge has not changed noticeably since Heller, and in fact was
higher in 2015 than in 2009.
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Table 11: Number of Paragraphs Devoted to Second Amendment
Discussion
Opinion year

Three
Paragraphs
or Less

More Than
Three
Paragraphs

Total
Challenges

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Total

27

58

62

62

58

61

69

54

2

453

39%

51%

43%

35%

36%

42%

36%

37%

40%

39%

43

56

81

116

103

83

124

91

3

700

61%

49%

57%

65%

64%

58%

64%

63%

60%

61%

70

114

143

178

161

144

193

145

5

1153

p > 0.10*
*Excluding 2016

Identifying the content of that analysis presents challenges. It is
often said, both by critics and supporters, that the courts of appeals
have universally adopted a two-part test for analyzing Second
Amendment claims.241 But only a minority of the challenges in our
dataset (41 percent) explicitly involved that test.242
There are good reasons to suppose that these results underreport
the influence and adoption of the two-part test, however, at least within
the federal courts. Just 32 percent of state appellate challenges applied
the two-part test, compared with 46 percent of federal challenges.
Moreover, as in other areas, courts may not be explicit when they are
using the two-part test—many of the cases that involve the application
of tiered scrutiny might actually be instances of courts assuming
coverage and skipping to the second step.243 Finally, the percentage of
241. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text.
242. Use of the two-part test increased from 2009 to 2010, when the test was first articulated
in United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010). But, interestingly, our coders
identified fifty-five cases in 2008 and 2009 that applied the two-part test, suggesting that
Marzzarella effectively codified a test that was already in use, rather than creating one from
scratch.
243. The dataset shows one hundred challenges involving application of scrutiny but not the
two-part test. Reviewing these cases confirms that courts seem to be following the basic outlines
of the two-part test even when they do not say so explicitly. The First Circuit, for example, does
not seem to have officially adopted the two-part test, and none of its decisions in our dataset are
coded as applying it. But in United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2011), the court
apparently assumed that the conduct at issue was covered and went on apply heightened scrutiny.
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cases applying the two-part test increased steadily after 2012. This may
reflect the growing impact of circuit opinions expressly adopting this
decisional framework.244 Of the nine circuits that expressly adopted the
two-part test, six did so in 2011 or later.245
Table 12: Application of Two-Part Test
Opinion year
2008
Applies
Two-Part
Test
Does Not
Apply
Two-Part
Test
Total
Challenges

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Total

27

28

52

84

65

61

84

66

2

469

39%

25%

36%

47%

40%

42%

44%

46%

40%

41%

43

86

91

94

96

83

109

79

3

684

61%

75%

64%

53%

60%

58%

56%

54%

60%

59%

70

114

143

178

161

144

193

145

5

1153

p < 0.10*
*Excluding 2016

Our data provides support for the proposition—occasionally
phrased as a complaint—that original historical analysis is not the sole
driving force in Second Amendment cases.246 In just a small minority
Similarly, in Hightower v. City of Boston, 693 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2012), the court held that the
Second Amendment “claim fail[ed] whatever standard of scrutiny is used, even assuming there is
some Second Amendment interest in carrying the concealed weapons at issue.” Id. at 74.
244. See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2013); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of
Am., Inc. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir.
2012); GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1261 n.34 (11th Cir. 2012); United States
v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 163–64 (2d Cir. 2012); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th
Cir. 2012); Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673,
680 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010); Marzzarella,
614 F.3d at 89. We omit the Seventh Circuit from this list. Though the Seventh Circuit purported
to adopt the test in Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 700–04 (7th Cir. 2011), subsequent
circuit precedent has opted for other doctrinal frames. For instance, in Friedman v. City of
Highland Park, Ill., 784 F.3d 406 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 447 (2015), Judge
Easterbrook explained:
[I]nstead of . . . decid[ing] what “level” of scrutiny applies, and how it works . . . we
think it better to ask whether a regulation bans weapons that were common at the time
of ratification or those that have “some reasonable relationship to . . . a well regulated
militia,” and whether law-abiding citizens retain adequate means of self-defense.
Id. at 410 (citation omitted) (first citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 622–25
(2008); then citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178–79 (1939)).
245. See Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127; Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc., 700 F.3d 185;
GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc., 687 F.3d 1244; Decastro, 682 F.3d 160; Greeno, 679 F.3d 510; Heller II,
670 F.3d 1244.
246. See supra note 91; see also Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1174–75 (9th Cir.
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of challenges (16 percent) did the court cite historical sources from one
of the periods we coded. Cited sources most commonly dated between
1935 and 1968 (in 116 of 184 challenges), and only twenty-nine
challenges prompted citations to the pre-1791 sources that played a
prominent role in Heller.247
Table 13: Citations to Historical Sources
Opinion year
2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Total

Pre-1791 Sources

3

3

7

3

6

0

5

2

0

29

1791-1868 Sources

2

5

6

4

6

4

10

5

0

42

1869-1891 Sources

5

9

10

7

5

5

7

2

0

50

1892-1934 Sources

2

8

8

7

8

4

7

4

0

48

1935-1968 Sources

5

11

26

19

24

4

13

14

0

116

Total

11

19

36

30

31

11

29

17

0

184

Total challenges
% Citing Hist.
Sources

70

114

143

178

161

144

193

145

5

1153

16%

17%

25%

17%

19%

8%

15%

12%

0%

16%

p > 0.10*
*P-value calculated for last row: likelihood of citing any historical sources;
excluding 2016

Interestingly for our chronological story, the quantity of these
citations did not change as we had predicted during the course of the
study. We had expected that historical analysis would be displaced by
precedent. It appears that original historical analysis has more
longevity, albeit less initial prominence, than we imagined.
Along the same lines, a similarly small percentage of challenges
(18 percent) involved explicit consideration of whether a law was
“longstanding” so as to fall within Heller’s exceptions. The data reflects
no significant variation over time.

2014), rev’d on reh’g en banc, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016) (“In light of Heller, the Second Circuit
erred in outright rejecting history and tradition as unhelpful and ambiguous, and the Third and
Fourth Circuits erred in following suit.” (citation omitted)).
247. Some opinions cite from more than one historical period, which is why row values do not
sum to total values in Table 12.
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Table 14: Consideration of Whether Weapon Law is Longstanding
Opinion year

Considers
Whether Law
"Longstanding"
Does Not
Consider
Whether Law
"Longstanding"
Total
Challenges

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Total

15

21

21

39

25

25

25

33

1

205

21%

18%

15%

22%

16%

17%

13%

23%

20%

18%

55

93

122

139

136

119

168

112

4

948

79%

82%

85%

78%

84%

83%

87%

77%

80%

82%

70

114

143

178

161

144

193

145

5

1153

p > 0.10*
*Excluding 2016

If not originalism, on what basis are courts deciding Second
Amendment cases? One possibility, as suggested above, is that they are
increasingly relying on the ever-growing body of controlling precedent.
And yet the proportion of cases in which courts expressly held that the
Second Amendment issue was already decided by a controlling opinion
has remained near constant and has always been low, representing only
239 total cases, no higher than 25 percent in any given year (29 of 114
in 2009). That said, this variable seems susceptible to undercoding—in
only forty-eight cases did the court characterize the issue as one of first
impression, leaving roughly three-quarters of the challenges coded as
being neither expressly controlled by precedent nor involving issues of
first impression.
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Table 15: Challenges Governed by Controlling Opinions
Opinion year

Controlling
Opinion
Total
Cases
Percentage

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Total

11

29

35

39

28

27

40

28

2

239

70

114

143

178

161

144

193

145

5

1153

16%

25%

24%

22%

17%

19%

21%

19%

40%

21%

p > 0.10*
*Excluding 2016

There has been, however, at least one noticeable change in the
doctrine over time: an increasing application of levels-of-scrutiny
analysis. Challenges decided by levels-of-scrutiny analysis still
represent a minority—just 29 percent of the entire dataset—but the
proportion generally increased during the study period.
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Table 16: Success Rates and Trends for Levels-of-Scrutiny Analysis
2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Total

0/4

0/4

0/2

0/1

1/2

0/1

2/9

2/3

0/1

5/27

0%

0%

0%

0%

50%

0%

22%

67%

0%

19%

0/1

1/6

1/28

0/38

2/45

4/41

5/50

11/33

0/0

24/242

0%

17%

4%

0%

4%

10%

10%

33%

0%

10%

0/0

0/1

0/2

0/1

0/2

0/1

0/3

0/0

0/0

0/10

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0/0

0/0

1/1

0/2

0/1

0/0

0/6

0/2

0/0

1/12

0%

0%

100%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

8%

0/3

0/2

1/2

1/7

2/7

0/9

4/10

0/1

0/0

8/41

0%

0%

50%

14%

29%

0%

40%

0%

0%

20%

0/8

1/13

3/35

1/49

5/57

4/52

11/78

13/39

0/1

38/332

0%

8%

9%

2%

9%

8%

14%

33%

0%

11%

Total Challenges

70

114

143

178

161

144

193

145

5

1153

Percentage
Applying Scrutiny

11%

11%

24%

28%

35%

36%

40%

27%

20%

29%

Strict Scrutiny

Intermediate
Scrutiny

Rational Basis
Review

“Reasonableness”
Review

Applied a Levelof-Scrutiny
Analysis, But Did
Not Specify

Combined
Scrutiny

p < 0.025*
*P-value calculated on final row: percentage of challenges facing scrutiny analysis;
excluding 2016
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Intermediate scrutiny has been the most prevalent form of
scrutiny, no matter which category of court one considers. As between
the court systems, when levels-of-scrutiny analysis is applied, federal
appellate courts select intermediate scrutiny 79 percent of the time,
more frequently than federal district courts (74 percent of the time)
and state appellate courts (68 percent). Contrary to the common
assertion, application of intermediate scrutiny has not invariably been
fatal to Second Amendment claims. In fact, challenges subject to
intermediate scrutiny prevailed at a rate (10 percent) slightly higher
than the overall success rate for Second Amendment claims (9
percent). Obviously the two variables are related—the former being a
subset of the latter—but since intermediate scrutiny cases only account
for 21 percent of the overall set, they are not entirely confounding.
Claims triggering strict scrutiny succeeded at a higher rate (19 percent),
but strict scrutiny was far from fatal to challenged weapon laws.248 Fully
understanding those victories, however, requires a closer look at the
subset of successful Second Amendment challenges, which is the
subject of the next Part.
IV. WHAT MAKES FOR A SUCCESSFUL SECOND AMENDMENT
CHALLENGE?
There are innumerable reasons why a court might reject a Second
Amendment challenge—perhaps it was brought by a felon (273
challenges) and therefore governed directly by Heller, or perhaps the
government has shown that the law sufficiently furthers a sufficiently
strong government interest (237 challenges). Particularly in light of the
low success rate, the most interesting set of challenges are the
exceptions: those that have succeeded.249 What do they have in
common? What can they tell us about Second Amendment doctrine?

248. Cf. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 869–71 (2006) (concluding that challenges
subject to strict scrutiny succeed at different rates, depending on the right invoked and other
specified factors).
249. As noted above, our analysis in this section focuses not on cases, but on challenges—of
which one opinion might address many. See, e.g., Ezell v. City of Chicago, 70 F. Supp. 3d 871, 875,
882 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (addressing separately each of the plaintiffs’ eleven separate Second
Amendment claims).
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A. High-Level Observations
About two-thirds of successful challenges in the dataset are at the
appellate level (70 out of 108). And of those, the appellate court
rejected at least part of the lower court’s Second Amendment holding
96 percent of the time. This suggests that, at least in these cases, the
appeals courts are not acting as rubber stamps after trial courts dismiss
Second Amendment claims.
Table 17: Affirmance Rates in Successful Appeals

Affirmed
Did Not Affirm
Affirmed in part
Total

Federal Appellate
Court
1
3%
12
41%
16
55%
29

State Appellate
Court
2
5%
19
46%
20
49%
41

Total
3
4%
31
44%
36
51%
70

Within federal courts of appeals, about 96 percent of successes
came out of the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits—
far higher than the 54 percent (119 of 219) of Second Amendment cases
heard by those circuits. These are circuits where states with relatively
strict gun laws are located,250 so it may well be the case that other
circuits have fewer Second Amendment “wins” because they do not
have as many strict gun laws to challenge. For example, challenges to
municipal gun regulations succeed more frequently than challenges to
state or federal regulations (22 percent versus 12 and 3 percent), and
municipal gun regulation is strictly preempted in every state outside of
the circuits listed above.251 Regardless of such discrepancies, the
relatively high proportion of successes in the Second, Fourth, Seventh,
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits is consistent with the view that these courts
are not in open rebellion against the Second Amendment.252

250. See supra notes 190–94 and accompanying text.
251. Jon S. Vernick & Lisa M. Hepburn, State and Federal Gun Laws: Trends for 1970–99, in
EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 345, 349 (Jens Ludwig & Philip
J. Cook eds., 2003).
252. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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Table 18: Successful Challenges by Circuit
Circuit

Successful
Challenges

Circuit

Successful
Challenges

First

0 (0%)

Seventh

3 (11%)

Second
Third
Fourth

2 (7%)
0 (0%)
4 (14%)

Eighth
Ninth
Tenth

0 (0%)
4 (14%)
0 (0%)

Fifth
Sixth

0 (0%)
1 (4%)

Eleventh
D.C.

0 (0%)
14 (50%)

Total

28 (100%)

Six states and the District of Columbia account for all successes at
the state appellate level, with the vast majority occurring in Illinois (68
percent). These are overwhelmingly a result of the decision in Aguilar
striking down Illinois’s public carry ban, which gave way to a deluge of
attacks on past convictions for violating that law.
Table 19: Successful Challenges by State253
State

Successful Challenges

Percent of Total

Connecticut

2

5%

District of
Columbia

5

12%

Illinois

28

68%

Michigan

2

5%

North
Carolina

1

2%

Ohio

2

5%

Wisconsin

1

2%

Total

41

100%

253. This chart omits states without any successful challenges.
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B. Doctrinal Observations
The way challenges are presented to the courts—either facially or
as-applied254—matters, and the latter can be expected to have a higher
rate of success.255 That is certainly true of Second Amendment
litigation in federal court, as the majority of all Second Amendment
successes (66 percent) came in cases where at least one form of relief
sought was as applied. State appellate litigation deviates from this
pattern as a result of the high number of post-Aguilar opinions out of
Illinois granting facial relief.
Table 20: Facial or As-Applied in Successful Challenges
Federal
Trial Court
Facial
As-applied
Both
Unspecified
Total

9
24%
14
37%
13
34%
2
5%
38

Federal
Appellate
Court
9
31%
4
14%
13
45%
3
10%
29

State
Appellate
Court
18
44%
6
15%
13
32%
4
10%
41

Total
36
33%
24
22%
39
36%
9
8%
108

Recent cases have expanded the availability of as-applied challenges in
the Second Amendment context,256 which suggests that the number of
successful challenges is likely to rise as well.
Our evidence suggests that, within successful challenges, where
254. Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 236,
236 (1994) (“Conventional wisdom holds that a court may declare a statute unconstitutional in
one of two manners: (1) the court may declare it invalid on its face, or (2) the court may find the
statute unconstitutional as applied to a particular set of circumstances.”).
255. Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449–51 (2008)
(explaining preference for as-applied challenges).
256. Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 682 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(permitting as-applied challenge to federal prohibition on possession by people subject to a prior
involuntary mental health commitment, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2012)); Binderup v. Att’y Gen.
U.S., 836 F.3d 336, 356–57 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (granting as-applied relief to plaintiffs
challenging the federal felon-in-possession law, § 922(g)(1)). But see Hamilton v. Pallozzi, 848
F.3d 614, 626 (4th Cir. 2017) (rejecting analysis from Binderup and holding that “conviction of a
felony necessarily removes one from the class of ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’ for the
purposes of the Second Amendment absent . . . narrow exceptions”).
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the court finds that a law infringes on the “core” or “central
component” of the right, the burden on the government increases. In
94 percent of the successful challenges where the court found that the
burden was not on the core of the right, the court applied intermediate,
as opposed to strict, scrutiny. Meanwhile, courts applied intermediate
scrutiny only 14 percent of the time when a burden did fall on the core
of the right. Otherwise, the court applied strict scrutiny (29 percent) or,
more commonly, granted relief without making clear what standard the
court was applying (57 percent).
Table 21: Burden on Second Amendment “Core” vs. Level of Scrutiny
in Successful Challenges

Burden
on
"core"

Strict
Scrutiny

Intermediate
Scrutiny

Rational
Basis
Review

“Reasonableness”
Review

Applied a
Level-ofScrutiny
Analysis, But
Did Not
Specify Which
One

4

2

0

0

8

14

29%

14%

0%

0%

57%

100%

Total

Burden
not on
"core"

1

15

0

0

0

16

6%

94%

0%

0%

0%

100%

Total

5

17

0

0

8

30

Only federal courts appear to regularly make the “core” inquiry:
it was explicit in just four successful state appellate challenges, perhaps
because fewer state courts are relying on the two-part test.
Heller looked to history to strike down the District of Columbia’s
handgun ban. Since then, briefs, scholars, and litigants have debated
whether history supports one side or the other in Second Amendment
cases.257 Courts explaining why Second Amendment challenges
succeed cite to historical sources (defined as non-case-law sources from
before 1968) 20 percent of the time, a slightly higher proportion than
the set as a whole (16 percent). This suggests that judicial historical
257. Compare Brief for Everytown for Gun Safety as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees and
Affirmance at 10–27, Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (en banc) (No.
16-7025) (arguing historical evidence supports constitutionality of D.C. gun regulation), with
Brief for National Rifle Association of America, Inc., as Amici Curiae Supporting PlaintiffsAppellees and Affirmance at 10–15, Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(en banc) (No. 16-7067) (arguing the contrary).
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analysis may influence success in Second Amendment litigation,
though we found no evidence of a significant relationship in
regression.258 A majority of these challenges cite to pre-1891 sources,
which Heller deemed most probative. Federal courts are much more
likely than state appellate courts to cite history when explaining why a
Second Amendment claim prevails.
Table 22: Historical Citations in Successful Challenges
Federal Trial
Court

Federal
Appellate Court

State Appellate
Court

Total

Pre-1791
Sources

2

6

0

8

1791-1868
Sources

2

3

2

7

1869-1891
Sources

3

3

2

8

3

2

2

7

4

4

1

9

Any Period

10

9

3

22

Total
Successes

38

29

41

108

Percentage

26%

31%

7%

20%

1892-1934
Sources
1935-1968
Sources

The two-part test was applied in 50 percent of successful
challenges. Interestingly, that number jumps to 79 percent in federal
appellate court, but drops to just 22 percent in state appellate court, a
reflection that the two-part test is more prevalent in federal court.

258. Cf. Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun Control,
NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 35 (concluding that Heller’s approach was “not evidence of
disinterested historical inquiry” but rather “evidence of the ability of well-staffed courts to
produce snow jobs”).
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Table 23: Application of Two-Part Test in Successful Challenges
Federal Trial
Court
Court Applies
Two-Part Test

Federal Appellate
Court

State Appellate
Court

Total

22

23

9

54

58%

79%

22%

50%

Court Does Not
Apply Two-Part
Test

16

6

32

54

42%

21%

78%

50%

Total

38

29

41

108

When the two-part test was applied in these cases, the court either
applied heightened scrutiny to strike down the challenged policy (61
percent) or dealt with the case in another way. Federal appellate
courts, for example, often remanded to district courts to apply
heightened scrutiny in the first instance.
Table 24: Outcome of Two-Part Test in Successful Challenges

Found Second
Amendment
coverage and
law failed
heightened
scrutiny

Federal Trial
Court

Federal
Appellate Court

State Appellate
Court

Total

19

8

6

33

86%

35%

67%

61%

3

15

3

21

14%

65%

33%

39%

22

23

9

54

Other

Total

C. Regressions
The empirical results reported until this point include direct
results and contingency tables for one or more coded variables. The
former are simply the survey results, reported either in raw numbers or
percentages. The latter give a basic view of the interaction between
multiple variables.
We have also made use of another statistical modeling tool:
regression analysis. Regressions can help demonstrate how a
dependent variable—in our case, the success or not of a Second
Amendment claim—changes when other, independent variables are
changed. The basic idea is to establish which of many possible
independent variables is most closely associated with changes in the
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dependent variable. For example, regression analysis can help show
not just whether success rates are higher in particular courts but
whether, holding all else equal, filing a particular claim in one court as
opposed to another will increase its odds of success.
But many variables are related—the impact, or odds multiplier, of
one variable can have an impact on another. This complicates the
analysis. One way to capture these interrelationships is through the use
of multiple regression: identifying a cluster of independent variables
and testing them simultaneously. The calculation and interpretation of
results are complex when using multiple regression analysis, precisely
because of the possible interrelationship between those variables.
Multiple regression is therefore especially sensitive to the choice of
independent variables—a strongly predictive variable can be weaker,
or even negative, with the addition of other variables.
Using fixed effects logit models and with the assistance of an
empiricist,259 we tested five clusters of independent variables to see if
and how well they predict success. We settled on these five models after
initially testing a larger range of variables and ruling out those that
were not predictive, statistically significant, or otherwise noteworthy.
We plan to return to those variables in future work. The results are
contained in Table 25.

259. See generally PAUL D. ALLISON, FIXED EFFECTS REGRESSION MODELS (2009). We owe
an enormous debt of gratitude to Guangya Liu of the J. Michael Goodson Law Library at Duke
Law School for her help in designing and performing the regression analysis.
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Table 25: Odds Ratios for Winning Second Amendment Challenges
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Models 1 and 2 seek to test the hypothesis, explicit in a common
critique of Second Amendment case law,260 that federal appellate
courts are especially resistant to granting Second Amendment relief.
Contrary to that theory, Models 1 and 2 show that litigation in federal
appellate courts is correlated with success, not failure, as compared to
litigation in federal trial courts or state appellate courts. If a Second
Amendment challenge is litigated in federal appellate court as opposed
to state appellate court, the odds of success increase by 65 percent. If
the challenge is litigated in federal appellate court as opposed to
federal trial court, the odds of success increase by 84 percent. These
models suggest that claims about neglect of the Second Amendment
right in the federal appellate courts are overblown.
Of course, the venue of litigation is not the only important driver
of success or failure. Other substantive factors matter, and rightly so.
Models 3 and 4 seek to test some of them. Model 3 includes variables
relating to the context in which a challenge is brought (civil versus
criminal) and the authority for the challenged law, policy, or official
action, be it state, federal, municipal, or other. Three sets of variables
stand out as having a statistically significant impact on success.261 First,
a civil claim is 71 percent more likely to succeed than a criminal claim.
Second, challenges to federal laws, as opposed to state laws,
correspond with a 63 percent decrease in the odds of success. Third,
challenges to municipal laws, as opposed to state laws, correspond with
an 86 percent increase in the odds of success.
Model 4 asks whether the category of law matters. In this model,
two categories returned statistically significant results at the p < 0.05
level. Challenges to “who” bans, as opposed to the other categories,
are 60 percent less likely to succeed. This is consistent with our analysis
of Table 7, and the fact that 96 percent of challenges to “who” bans
failed during the study period.
Challenges to public carry regimes, by contrast, have a higher rate
of success than the average Second Amendment case—a result that
increases when one controls for year. As noted in Table 7, these
challenges have prevailed 22 percent of the time—roughly two and a
half times the overall success rate—and our regression reflects that

260. See supra notes 64–83 and accompanying text.
261. Not all variables we tested in these models returned statistically significant results. We
consider statistically significant those variables that returned a p-value less than 0.05, which is a
commonly accepted threshold. See ALLISON, supra note 259. Such variables are indicated with
***, **, or * in Table 25.
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they multiply the odds of success by 3.72.
But success is not static across public carry subcategories, and
much of the high success rate can be attributed to litigation involving
bans on public carry in Illinois and the District of Columbia. In
particular, challenges to the Illinois and D.C. bans are almost 16 times
more likely to succeed than challenges to other types of public carry
restrictions. Compared to the entire universe of gun laws in the
database, challenges to these public carry bans are close to 19 times
more likely to succeed. Challenges to permitting schemes for open or
concealed carry, meanwhile, are 74 percent less likely to succeed than
challenges to public carry bans.
Finally, Model 5 looks at select doctrinal considerations. Our goal
with this model was to test whether certain doctrinal features are
related to the success of Second Amendment claims. We selected these
variables based in part on our own sense of what would likely correlate
with success (for example, a finding that a regulation touches on the
“core” of the Amendment) and a preliminary regression of many
doctrinal variables.
The results confirm that certain factors relating to how a court
considers Second Amendment claims point to success or failure. Two
factors stood out as particularly significant. First, challenges that spawn
less than three paragraphs of attention have a 56 percent lower chance
of winning. Second, if the court concludes that the challenged
regulation burdens the “core” of the right to keep and bear arms, the
odds of success multiply by 5.76.
These simple models represent five different ways to understand
the factors driving the success or failure of Second Amendment claims.
They are by no means the only ways to do so, and in future work we
plan to pursue deeper analysis of these and other variables.
CONCLUSION
In important ways, the Second Amendment belongs increasingly
to lawyers and legal analysis. The Supreme Court’s decision in District
of Columbia v. Heller presented judges, advocates, and scholars with a
remarkable responsibility and opportunity to construct constitutional
doctrine regarding the right to keep and bear arms. Over the past
decade, more than one thousand opinions, scores of scholarly books
and articles, and innumerable public and private debates show that this
task is well underway. We have attempted to provide an empirical
account of where the doctrine is and how it got there.
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That does not mean that Second Amendment doctrine can be
reduced to an equation or that it is susceptible to the kind of soundbite
analysis that some advocates urge. But our analysis does suggest at
least a few major observations:
The low success rate of Second Amendment claims does not show
that the right is being underenforced. It has become an article of faith in
some quarters that courts are refusing to enforce the Second
Amendment right articulated in Heller.262 Fully evaluating this claim
would require the establishment of a baseline that is beyond the scope
of this paper.263 But our data shows that the low rate of success
probably has more to do with the claims being asserted than with
judicial hostility to the right. Fully 24 percent of the challenges in our
set are to felon-in-possession laws, all but 1 percent of which are
failures—a result easily reconciled with Heller’s plain text. In fact, a
clear majority of the challenges—742 of 1,153—arose in criminal cases,
in which defense counsel might be expected to raise any
nonsanctionable defense. The low rate of success in those cases (6
percent) and the 126 cases involving pro se litigants (2 percent) pulls
down the success rate as a whole.
The Second Amendment is becoming more “legalistic.” Since
Heller, Second Amendment cases have made increasing use of the
common tools of constitutional doctrine. Heller’s own reference to
“presumptively lawful” regulations is cited in 60 percent of the cases in
our dataset. A steadily increasing percentage of courts—and a solid
majority of federal courts of appeal—have applied the two-part test264
or a levels-of-scrutiny analysis265 familiar to other areas of
constitutional law.
The doctrinal landscape is more diverse, nuanced, and interesting
than many suppose. In the ten years since Heller, many broad and
confident assertions have been made about Second Amendment
doctrine, including by the authors of this paper: that it is governed by
history, that the two-part test has been universally adopted, or that
intermediate scrutiny is a rubber-stamp for regulation. Our data shows
that the reality is far more complex—neither history266 nor the two-part

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

See supra Part I.B.1.
See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text.
See supra Table 12.
See supra Table 16.
See supra Table 14.
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test267 control the field, and intermediate scrutiny challenges actually
succeed at a higher rate than the set as a whole.268 One possible
interpretation of this is that Second Amendment doctrine exhibits the
kind of complexity and demands the kind of attention as that of the
First Amendment and others.
Litigation, and especially successful litigation, is not evenly
distributed geographically or across court systems. The Second
Amendment is, in many ways, a profoundly regional Amendment. Two
courts account for about one-third of the challenges in the federal
courts of appeal; four states account for 68 percent of the state
appellate challenges.269 Unsurprisingly, these circuits and states are
among those with comparatively stringent gun control.270 Many also
have relatively high success rates, both in absolute terms and
proportionally.271 Moreover, a solid majority of Second Amendment
litigation occurs in state courts (441 of 662 appellate challenges),
although those cases rarely garner attention in scholarship.
Party identity matters. The success rate of Second Amendment
claims is highly correlated with who makes them, and whether and how
they are represented. Civil litigants succeeded two and half times more
often than criminal defendants.272 Represented civil plaintiffs had a
success rate of 40 percent in the federal appellate courts.273 These
trends are likely due, at least in part, to case selection: civil attorneys
are selecting better cases to litigate.
In addition to identifying these baselines, we also hope to have
highlighted trends and issues that warrant further study, and which our
dataset might help address.274 Future projects might pursue the
attitudinalist angle, seeking to determine whether judicial ideology has
more explanatory or predictive power than the doctrinal variables we
have identified. Or, perhaps with the aid of deeper qualitative analysis,
scholars might be able to further explain why so many apparently weak

267. See supra Table 12.
268. See supra Table 16 (10 percent for intermediate scrutiny cases, as compared to 9 percent
for the set as a whole).
269. See supra notes 189–94 and accompanying text.
270. Id.
271. See supra Tables 2 & 3.
272. See supra Table 4. It would, of course, be equally proper to call this a difference in the
substance of the claim, not party identity.
273. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
274. Hall & Wright, supra note 17, at 87 (identifying this as a basic purpose of content
analysis).
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Second Amendment claims are filed in the first place.
While our primary goal has been to investigate Second
Amendment doctrine empirically, doing so inevitably raises broader
questions—and at least some lessons—about doctrinal empiricism
more broadly. We place ourselves squarely in the camp of those who
believe that careful, systematic study of case content can yield valuable
insights about the development and content of law.

